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Introduction	  _____________________________________________________________________	  
	  Illness	  touches	  all	  of	  us,	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly,	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  reality	  with	  physical	  and	  psychological	  ramifications,	  we	  turn	  to	  diagnosis	  for	  answers.	  The	  role	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  to	  place	  a	  name	  upon	  a	  bodily	  disorder,	  giving	  a	  patient	  some	  idea	  of	  what	  has	  gone	  wrong	  in	  his	  or	  her	  body,	  and	  how	  life	  may	  change.	  At	  its	  essence,	  diagnosis	  renders	  a	  mysterious	  set	  of	  symptoms	  into	  a	  tangible,	  understandable	  disease	  that	  can,	  ideally,	  be	  recognized	  and	  treated.	  Yet	  this	  perspective	  can	  seem	  strangely	  simplistic.	  How	  can	  a	  single	  word	  or	  phrase	  encapsulate	  the	  variable	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  of	  illness	  on	  the	  complicated	  lives	  we	  live?	  And	  what	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  phrase	  to	  a	  patient’s	  life:	  a	  comforting	  awareness,	  an	  estrangement	  from	  healthy	  society,	  or	  something	  in	  between?	  	  	   The	  narrative	  of	  illness	  often	  deviates	  from	  the	  simple	  symptoms-­‐diagnosis-­‐treatment-­‐health	  story,	  especially	  when	  chronic,	  terminal,	  or	  unknown	  diseases	  manifest	  in	  the	  body.	  Chronic	  disease	  changes	  not	  only	  physical	  aspects	  of	  health,	  but	  also	  the	  way	  individuals	  perceive	  themselves	  and	  their	  position	  in	  family	  and	  society.	  When	  faced	  with	  serious	  disease,	  some	  turn	  to	  writing	  to	  chronicle	  their	  experiences,	  and	  these	  illness	  narratives	  provide	  a	  uniquely	  personal	  window	  into	  the	  relationship	  between	  illness,	  diagnosis,	  and	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self-­‐image.	  Additionally,	  fictional	  accounts	  of	  illness	  provide	  societal	  perspectives	  and	  reveal	  useful	  frames	  for	  understanding	  these	  ideas.	  	   A	  suitable	  place	  to	  start	  is	  with	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  the	  1980s,	  which	  combined	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  very	  serious,	  fast-­‐moving	  disease	  with	  strong	  societal	  stigma	  resulting	  from	  the	  overrepresentation	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  fringe	  groups	  such	  as	  gay	  men	  and	  IV	  drug	  users.	  Dr.	  Anthony	  Fauci,	  current	  director	  of	  National	  Institute	  of	  Allergy	  and	  Infectious	  Diseases,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health,	  was	  a	  leading	  infectious	  disease	  researcher	  during	  this	  time.	  He	  illuminates	  the	  surprisingly	  quick	  and	  simple	  creation	  of	  a	  diagnostic	  name:	  Dr.	  Fauci	  and	  five	  other	  leading	  scientists	  sat	  down	  in	  a	  room	  at	  a	  scientific	  meeting	  and	  chose	  “human	  immunodeficiency	  virus”	  because	  a	  virus	  compromised	  patients’	  immune	  systems,	  and	  “acquired	  immune	  deficiency	  syndrome,”	  or	  AIDS,	  because	  this	  virus	  caused	  sudden	  and	  massive	  loss	  of	  immune	  function.	  Yet	  the	  quick	  creation	  of	  a	  name	  for	  this	  illness	  had	  long-­‐lasting	  effects,	  as	  the	  view	  of	  patients	  toward	  their	  disease	  shifted	  from	  “horror”	  before	  the	  terms	  “HIV”	  and	  “AIDS”	  existed,	  to	  feelings	  of	  “depression	  and	  dread”	  once	  these	  terms	  became	  known	  (Fauci).	  The	  scientific	  function	  of	  naming	  this	  disease	  was	  accompanied	  by	  psychosocial	  effects,	  giving	  afflicted	  patients	  a	  label	  for	  the	  reason	  their	  bodies	  were	  failing.	  While	  the	  name	  tamed	  the	  horror	  in	  patients’	  view	  of	  their	  disease,	  the	  terms	  “HIV”	  and	  “AIDS”	  quickly	  became	  socially	  charged,	  carrying	  with	  them	  assumptions	  of	  contagion	  and	  impending	  mortality.	  	  	   Moments	  of	  diagnosis	  are	  often	  incredibly	  powerful	  scenes	  in	  AIDS	  narratives,	  and	  commonalities	  in	  language	  appear	  in	  almost	  all	  of	  these	  scenes.	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This	  particular	  diagnosis	  is	  one	  that	  has	  “blasted	  the	  world	  apart”	  and	  leaves	  HIV	  positive	  individuals	  completely	  unprepared	  for	  drastic	  termination	  of	  normal	  life,	  replaced	  by	  the	  constant	  presence	  of	  illness	  (Doty	  139).	  Yet	  diagnosis	  is	  intriguing	  beyond	  just	  its	  power	  to	  reshape	  and	  end.	  It	  allows	  for	  a	  refocusing	  as	  well,	  a	  sudden	  urgency	  to	  discover	  what	  truly	  matters	  before	  it	  is	  too	  late.	  The	  stigma	  accompanying	  HIV/AIDS	  makes	  this	  diagnosis	  all	  the	  more	  complex,	  shaping	  both	  the	  social	  perspectives	  of	  those	  afflicted	  in	  these	  fringe	  groups	  (mostly	  gay	  men)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  personal	  identities	  of	  HIV	  positive	  individuals	  from	  socially	  “unexpected”	  places.	  In	  Abraham	  Verghese’s	  My	  Own	  Country,	  the	  middle-­‐aged,	  devoutly	  Catholic,	  heterosexual	  Mr.	  and	  Mrs.	  Johnson	  must	  grapple	  with	  how	  to	  approach	  the	  presence	  of	  HIV	  in	  their	  bodies,	  as	  well	  as	  discover	  how	  it	  will	  change	  their	  social	  position	  (240-­‐251).	  	   Although	  a	  diagnosis	  can	  place	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  socially	  marginalized	  group,	  as	  occurred	  with	  HIV/AIDS,	  it	  also	  provides	  belonging	  and	  comfort	  in	  that	  same	  group.	  This	  comfort	  is	  unattainable	  for	  those	  who	  are	  sick	  yet	  have	  no	  name	  for	  their	  disorder,	  and	  another	  important	  reality	  to	  discuss	  is	  the	  complete	  absence	  of	  diagnosis	  for	  a	  chronic	  disease.	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  illness	  narrative	  becomes	  an	  all-­‐out	  search	  for	  diagnosis	  to	  name	  the	  disorder	  occurring	  in	  one’s	  body,	  yet	  this	  pursuit	  is	  often	  in	  vain.	  An	  uncomfortable	  tension	  exists	  in	  knowing	  something	  in	  one’s	  body	  is	  amiss,	  yet	  finding	  no	  affirmation	  in	  the	  medical	  sphere.	  Meghan	  O’Rourke,	  in	  her	  2013	  New	  Yorker	  essay	  “What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Me?”	  describes	  this	  situation	  as	  a	  concern	  she	  will	  be	  labeled	  one	  of	  the	  “worried	  well,”	  healthy	  individuals	  falsely	  claiming	  to	  be	  ill.	  Who	  will	  believe	  her	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when	  the	  seemingly	  omniscient	  and	  invincible	  realm	  of	  medicine	  can’t	  confirm	  her	  illness	  through	  a	  diagnosis?	  To	  what	  level	  does	  even	  she	  then	  question	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  disorder	  in	  her	  own	  body,	  as	  time	  goes	  on	  and	  she	  forgets	  what	  being	  healthy	  feels	  like?	  The	  traditional	  “medical	  narrative”	  begins	  with	  symptoms	  and	  moves	  linearly	  to	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment,	  yet	  some	  patients	  hang	  in	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  steps	  of	  symptoms	  and	  diagnosis,	  and	  utilize	  narrative	  to	  discern	  how	  they	  see	  themselves	  and	  their	  disease,	  as	  well	  as	  where	  they	  stand	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  illness	  and	  health.	  	   Perhaps	  the	  opposite	  of	  an	  unnamed	  illness	  is	  the	  well-­‐known	  cancer	  diagnosis,	  which	  carries	  serious	  implications	  of	  mortality	  as	  well	  as	  dependence,	  being	  a	  disorder	  generally	  involving	  lengthy	  and	  expensive	  treatments	  at	  best	  and,	  at	  worst,	  total	  loss	  of	  life.	  Paul	  Kalanithi’s	  When	  Breath	  Becomes	  Air	  details	  his	  unique	  journey	  from	  neurosurgeon	  to	  terminal	  cancer	  patient.	  Although	  objective	  biology	  and	  medicine	  dominated	  his	  life	  until	  he	  learned	  of	  his	  cancer,	  data	  and	  survival	  curves	  gave	  Kalanithi	  no	  solace	  when	  he	  suddenly	  became	  a	  patient	  himself.	  He	  highlights	  a	  paradox	  of	  diagnosis,	  that	  before	  his	  diagnosis,	  “I	  knew	  someday	  I	  would	  die,	  but	  I	  didn’t	  know	  when”	  and	  afterwards,	  “I	  knew	  someday	  I	  would	  die,	  but	  I	  didn’t	  know	  when.	  But	  now	  I	  knew	  it	  acutely”	  (Kalanithi	  132).	  The	  moment	  of	  diagnosis	  may	  physically	  change	  nothing,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  changes	  everything.	  Echoing	  Mark	  Doty’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  as	  one	  that	  “blasted	  the	  world	  apart,”	  Kalanithi’s	  diagnostic	  moment	  was	  “as	  if	  a	  sandstorm	  had	  erased	  all	  trace	  of	  familiarity”	  (Kalanithi	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121).	  The	  word	  “cancer”	  has	  this	  immensely	  influential	  effect,	  and	  literature	  both	  describes	  and	  responds	  to	  the	  life-­‐changing	  power	  of	  both	  illness	  and	  diagnosis.	  In	  chapter	  one,	  I	  will	  investigate	  how	  the	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  diagnoses	  consume	  a	  patient’s	  identity	  and	  position	  them	  in	  a	  narrative	  that	  directs	  them	  towards	  physical	  and	  mental	  deterioration.	  Collectively,	  theoretical	  works	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Julia	  Kristeva,	  Susan	  Sontag,	  and	  Sander	  Gilman	  express	  exactly	  how	  a	  diagnosis	  can	  infect	  a	  patient’s	  self-­‐image	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  horror	  and	  separation	  from	  health	  and	  society.	  I	  will	  then	  analyze	  the	  nonfictional	  narratives	  My	  Own	  
Country,	  by	  Abraham	  Verghese,	  and	  Heaven’s	  Coast	  by	  Mark	  Doty;	  through	  analyses	  of	  these	  works,	  I	  will	  show	  how	  diagnosis	  both	  ostracizes	  patients	  and	  fences	  them	  in	  with	  their	  symptoms.	  Through	  exploration	  of	  these	  books,	  along	  with	  other	  short	  stories,	  essays,	  and	  works	  of	  photography	  I	  will	  elucidate	  how	  the	  lives	  and	  identities	  of	  AIDS	  patients	  are	  split	  into	  two	  distinct	  segments,	  the	  
before	  and	  the	  after	  of	  diagnosis,	  and	  how	  the	  sense	  of	  living,	  yet	  dying,	  shapes	  their	  reality.	  Chapter	  two	  addresses	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  all	  sick	  patients	  seek	  diagnosis,	  often	  this	  is	  unattainable	  when	  the	  medical	  world	  is	  unable	  to	  provide	  a	  name	  for	  a	  specific	  person’s	  set	  of	  symptoms.	  The	  absence	  of	  medical	  terminology	  to	  classify	  a	  disorder	  can	  have	  lasting	  effects	  on	  an	  individual	  whose	  life	  is	  being	  altered	  in	  a	  major	  way	  by	  disease,	  yet	  this	  same	  disease	  can’t	  always	  be	  proven	  or	  acknowledged	  by	  modern	  medicine.	  Alan	  Lightman’s	  The	  Diagnosis	  speaks	  to	  how	  precisely	  this	  lack	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  leads	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  agency	  for	  a	  patient.	  My	  analysis	  of	  this	  novel	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  Joshua	  Ferris’	  The	  Unnamed,	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as	  well	  as	  theoretical	  works	  by	  Annemarie	  Jutel	  and	  Michael	  Foucault,	  which	  show	  how	  patients,	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  diagnosis,	  must	  determine	  for	  themselves	  where	  to	  construct	  boundaries	  between	  sick	  and	  healthy	  in	  their	  own	  bodies.	  The	  dehumanizing	  nature	  of	  this	  self-­‐analysis	  leads	  to	  a	  conversation	  of	  how	  unnamed	  diseases	  appear	  to	  patients;	  the	  indescribable	  nature	  of	  these	  undiagnosed	  disorders	  gives	  the	  disorders	  themselves	  a	  mysterious,	  all-­‐encompassing	  personality	  of	  their	  own	  that	  continuously	  pulls	  at	  the	  seams	  of	  a	  patient’s	  identity.	  	   In	  chapter	  three	  I	  will	  extract	  meaning	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  cancer	  diagnosis.	  Works	  like	  Lorrie	  Moore’s	  short	  story	  “People	  Like	  That	  Are	  the	  Only	  People	  Here:	  Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  and	  the	  videogame	  That	  Dragon,	  
Cancer	  show	  how	  illness	  affects	  an	  entire	  family.	  In	  these	  stories,	  parents	  of	  children	  diagnosed	  with	  cancer	  try	  to	  reduce	  diagnosis	  to	  something	  tangible	  that	  they	  can	  understand.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  how	  diagnosis	  promises,	  yet	  ultimately	  fails,	  to	  encapsulate	  the	  multidimensional	  experience	  of	  illness	  in	  a	  single	  phrase.	  The	  theory	  of	  Susan	  Sontag	  exposes	  the	  role	  of	  narrative	  in	  depicting	  and	  comprehending	  disease—the	  very	  existence	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  power	  of	  narrative	  to	  represent	  disease	  and	  diagnosis.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  show	  how	  narrative	  can	  accompany,	  or	  even	  replace,	  diagnosis	  in	  providing	  meaning	  and	  sense	  to	  those	  whose	  lives	  have	  been	  reshaped	  by	  cancer.	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Chapter	  1	  
The	  HIV/AIDS	  Diagnosis	  _____________________________________________________________________	  
	   The	  intersection	  between	  health	  and	  disease	  maintains	  a	  constant	  presence	  in	  human	  life,	  resulting	  in	  both	  physical	  and	  psychosocial	  effects—those	  non-­‐tangible,	  yet	  undeniably	  present	  and	  important	  impacts	  that	  our	  views	  upon	  disease	  have	  within	  our	  lives.	  They	  shape	  how	  we	  frame	  ourselves,	  each	  other,	  and	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  The	  complex	  methods	  we	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  use	  to	  grasp	  breakdowns	  in	  health	  are	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  yet	  through	  discussion	  about	  them	  we	  can	  learn	  about	  how	  and	  why	  we	  react	  to	  disease	  the	  way	  we	  do.	  This	  discussion	  begins	  with	  utilizing	  literature	  concerning	  patients	  afflicted	  with	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  a	  period	  during	  which	  these	  disorders	  left	  behind	  a	  wake	  of	  destruction	  and	  societal	  stigma.	  	   Important	  distinctions	  exist	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  having	  an	  illness,	  and	  of	  living	  with	  a	  diagnosis.	  While	  the	  two	  occur	  simultaneously,	  having	  an	  illness	  is	  characterized	  by	  experiencing	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  symptoms,	  whereas	  living	  with	  a	  diagnosis	  involves	  constantly	  carrying	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  label.	  A	  diagnosis	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  transform	  a	  disorder	  into	  words,	  labeling	  a	  patient	  with	  a	  term	  or	  phrase	  that	  carries	  assumptions	  linked	  with	  the	  disorder.	  Through	  investigation	  of	  diagnosis	  in	  contemporary	  narrative	  about	  HIV	  and	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AIDS,	  I	  have	  found	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  upon	  a	  patient’s	  self-­‐image	  distance	  patients	  from	  their	  communities,	  and	  box	  them	  in	  with	  mental	  images	  and	  associations	  of	  their	  illness’s	  manifestations	  in	  the	  human	  body.	  The	  frame	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  both	  isolates	  the	  afflicted	  from	  society	  and	  eliminates	  their	  imagined	  distance	  from	  mortality	  and	  disintegration.	  This	  diagnosis	  also	  changes	  the	  space	  of	  an	  individual	  patient’s	  body	  and	  immediate	  surroundings	  into	  a	  reductive	  zone,	  in	  which	  others	  search	  for	  evidence	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  while	  ignoring	  this	  person’s	  humanity.	  HIV/AIDS	  patients	  don’t	  just	  live	  with	  their	  syndromes;	  instead,	  inhuman,	  deathly	  symptoms	  emanate	  from	  their	  bodies,	  and	  symbolize	  a	  terrifying	  tension	  between	  where	  the	  living	  ends	  and	  the	  dying	  begins.	  The	  diagnosis	  abducts	  the	  identity	  and	  places	  the	  person	  on	  a	  path	  towards	  a	  specific	  physical	  and	  mental	  destination,	  often	  holding	  the	  individual	  captive	  on	  a	  journey	  towards	  disintegration	  and	  isolation.	  	   When	  we	  think	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  the	  modern	  era,	  we	  think	  of	  a	  chronic,	  yet	  manageable	  disorder	  obtained	  through	  sex	  or	  intravenous	  needle	  use.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  our	  perception	  of	  these	  disorders	  has	  shifted	  drastically	  in	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  due	  to	  medical	  improvements	  and	  changing	  societal	  stereotyping	  of	  those	  with	  HIV/AIDS.	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  most	  people	  viewed	  an	  HIV	  positive	  diagnosis	  as	  a	  death	  sentence,	  which	  was	  not	  an	  illogical	  view	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  first	  effective	  drug,	  which	  only	  slowed	  the	  effects	  of	  AIDS,	  didn’t	  appear	  until	  1987	  (History	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  Overview).	  Additionally,	  the	  disorder	  was	  viewed	  as	  one	  that	  afflicted	  mostly	  homosexual	  men,	  with	  intravenous-­‐drug	  users	  and	  hemophiliacs	  affected	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  In	  reaction	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to	  this	  epidemic,	  societal	  constructions	  emerged	  of	  the	  disorder	  and	  those	  afflicted	  by	  it	  as	  a	  distinct,	  unnatural	  other.	  This	  social	  view	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  had	  both	  purposeful	  and	  subconscious	  roots,	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  frame	  is	  addressed	  in	  Sander	  Gilman’s	  book	  Disease	  and	  Representation:	  Images	  of	  Illness	  
from	  Madness	  to	  AIDS.	  	   One	  of	  Gilman’s	  most	  compelling	  arguments	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  when	  humans	  face	  a	  threat,	  we	  naturally	  seek	  to	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  it.	  This	  distancing	  is	  not	  just	  physical,	  but	  also	  mental.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  ignore	  our	  mortality	  in	  a	  world	  so	  full	  of	  injury	  and	  disease,	  so	  even	  when	  someone	  sick	  doesn’t	  pose	  a	  specific	  threat,	  their	  very	  existence	  serves	  to	  illuminate	  our	  own	  impermanence.	  The	  “terror	  of	  potential	  disintegration”	  is	  something	  humans	  live	  with	  yet	  hope	  to	  keep	  far	  away	  from	  present	  circumstances	  (Morantz-­‐Sanchez).	  The	  first	  step	  to	  remove	  one’s	  self	  from	  harm’s	  way	  is	  to	  define	  those	  who	  are	  in	  danger,	  so	  those	  afflicted	  with	  disease	  are	  labeled	  the	  Other,	  a	  group	  distinctly	  separate	  from	  those	  who	  are	  healthy.	  Here,	  they	  are	  conveniently	  detected	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  specific	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis	  (Gilman	  1).	  	  	   The	  Other	  are	  afflicted	  with	  a	  disorder	  that	  embodies	  fears	  society	  has	  about	  its	  own	  mortality.	  Othering	  is	  generally	  a	  non-­‐tangible	  action,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  we	  all	  perform	  constantly.	  Someone	  need	  not	  be	  visibly	  diseased	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  our	  mortality—the	  mere	  knowledge	  that	  someone	  has	  a	  tumor	  or	  an	  immunodeficiency	  syndrome	  appears	  equally	  as	  terrifying	  as	  an	  individual	  whose	  suffering	  stems	  from	  a	  visible	  source.	  Because	  othering	  serves	  to	  separate	  ourselves	  from	  disease,	  those	  who	  appear	  outwardly	  healthy	  and	  “normal”	  but	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are	  inwardly	  sick	  show	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  health	  and	  illness	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  make,	  and	  that	  this	  imagined	  separation	  can	  disappear	  as	  quickly	  as	  our	  perceptions	  of	  someone	  can	  change.	  	  Phrases	  found	  in	  literature	  about	  these	  othered	  groups	  show	  their	  heightened	  separation	  from	  “normal”	  society.	  One	  1990	  newspaper	  article	  referred	  to	  HIV/AIDS	  as	  “the	  gay	  plague,”	  and	  implicit	  in	  this	  term	  is	  a	  specific	  attempt	  to	  further	  alienate	  this	  diseased	  group	  from	  the	  non-­‐diseased	  public	  (Bremner).	  Although	  initially	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  afflicted	  were	  gay	  men,	  many	  with	  the	  disease	  were	  not.	  By	  not	  acknowledging	  these	  non-­‐gay	  afflicted	  HIV/AIDS	  patients,	  heterosexual	  members	  of	  the	  public	  could	  point	  to	  their	  sexuality	  as	  a	  way	  to	  assuage	  their	  fears	  of	  acquiring	  HIV.	  Secondly,	  this	  article	  posits	  that	  HIV-­‐infected	  people	  aren’t	  just	  sick;	  they	  have	  a	  “plague.”	  It	  seems	  backwards	  to	  call	  a	  disorder	  a	  “plague”	  to	  reduce	  fear	  of	  it,	  but	  now	  HIV	  has	  been	  framed	  as	  a	  plague	  affecting	  only	  homosexuals.	  “Human	  immunodeficiency	  virus”	  seemed	  far	  more	  terrifying	  to	  heterosexual	  America	  than	  a	  plague	  that	  seemingly	  affects	  only	  the	  homosexual	  population.	  Additionally,	  referring	  to	  these	  members	  of	  society	  as	  “plagued”	  results	  directly	  from	  notions	  of	  identifying	  and	  distancing	  those	  afflicted,	  and	  serves	  to	  assuage	  some	  level	  of	  guilt	  for	  their	  psychological,	  and	  sometimes	  physical,	  exile.	  	  	   Discussion	  of	  othering	  naturally	  leads	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  boundaries.	  Centuries	  ago,	  how	  were	  people	  infected	  with	  the	  bubonic	  plague	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  healthy	  population?	  Often,	  they	  were	  kicked	  outside	  of	  the	  castle	  walls.	  Because	  kicking	  the	  intimidating,	  supposedly	  threatening	  diseased	  population	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out	  of	  our	  cities	  is	  now	  unethical,	  the	  boundaries	  built	  are	  now	  utilized	  in	  the	  social	  psyche.	  Julia	  Kristeva	  and	  Michel	  Foucault	  provide	  an	  interesting	  discussion	  of	  the	  complications	  inherent	  in	  constructing	  these	  borders.	  	  Kristeva	  focuses	  on	  the	  psychological	  difference	  between	  the	  “I”	  and	  the	  “abject,”	  which	  includes	  the	  non-­‐living	  byproducts	  of	  humanity.	  Our	  mucus,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  normal	  (if	  distasteful)	  part	  of	  ourselves,	  yet	  once	  it	  leaves	  the	  boundaries	  of	  our	  bodies	  it	  becomes	  something	  different:	  clearly	  non-­‐human.	  	  Abjection	  “notifies	  us	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  human	  universe”—	  the	  universe	  physically	  made	  up	  of	  humans—but	  the	  line	  between	  ourselves	  and	  everything	  not-­‐ourselves	  is	  complicated	  by	  disease	  (Kristeva	  11).	  We	  naturally	  seek	  to	  view	  disease	  as	  abject,	  something	  distinctly	  non-­‐human.	  The	  main	  method	  through	  which	  we	  separate	  ourselves	  from	  the	  abject	  is	  our	  skin,	  but	  the	  physical	  aspects	  of	  disease	  themselves	  are	  microscopic	  invaders.	  Often	  skin	  is	  easily	  circumvented,	  or	  even	  passed	  through	  directly	  by	  viruses	  and	  bacteria.	  Disease	  uniquely	  complicates	  the	  boundaries	  between	  our	  bodies	  and	  our	  surroundings.	  Foucault	  poses	  a	  different	  question,	  which	  further	  complicates	  the	  topic	  of	  viewing	  disease	  as	  something	  distinctly	  abject:	  How	  can	  we	  view	  disease	  as	  an	  outside	  phenomenon,	  when	  by	  definition	  human	  diseases	  survive	  through	  human	  beings?	  “The	  organs	  are	  the	  concrete	  supports	  of	  the	  disease;	  they	  never	  constitute	  its	  indispensable	  conditions”	  (Foucault	  10).	  Foucault’s	  choice	  of	  the	  descriptor	  “concrete”	  emphasizes	  the	  idea	  that	  humans	  are	  not	  just	  a	  support	  that	  diseases	  subsist	  off	  of;	  we	  are	  the	  only	  subsistence	  they	  require.	  If	  our	  presence	  feeds	  and	  houses	  a	  disorder,	  how	  separate	  can	  humanity	  and	  disease	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truly	  be?	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  of	  HIV—the	  virus	  physically	  lives	  inside	  the	  cells	  of	  the	  immune	  system	  for	  years	  before	  the	  massive	  immunodeficiency	  called	  AIDS	  emerges.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  frame	  disease,	  especially	  one	  as	  intimate	  as	  HIV/AIDS,	  as	  a	  distinctly	  non-­‐human	  entity.	  We	  mentally	  seek	  to	  locate	  virus	  and	  harmful	  bacteria	  as	  outside	  of	  our	  bodies,	  yet	  when	  they	  cross	  the	  physical	  boundary	  of	  our	  skin	  suddenly	  discussion,	  study,	  and	  fear	  of	  pathogens	  begins	  to	  involve	  the	  human	  body	  itself.	  	  Our	  attempts	  to	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  HIV/AIDS,	  and	  to	  construct	  a	  border	  between	  the	  healthy	  and	  the	  sick,	  thus	  lead	  us	  to	  include	  the	  afflicted	  in	  our	  framing	  of	  the	  disease.	  This	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  stigma	  around	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis.	  To	  fully	  view	  HIV/AIDS,	  “to	  fully	  grasp	  the	  disease,	  one	  must	  look	  at	  those	  parts	  where	  there	  is	  dryness,	  ardour	  …	  humidity,	  discharge,	  debility”	  (Foucault	  13).	  Here,	  Foucault	  states	  we	  must	  look	  at	  the	  disease’s	  manifestations	  in	  the	  afflicted	  to	  “fully	  grasp”	  it.	  Yet	  this	  imposition	  of	  a	  disease’s	  character	  onto	  individuals	  affected	  goes	  beyond	  giving	  healthy	  people	  a	  “grasp”	  of	  illness.	  HIV	  positive	  individuals	  have	  characteristics	  and	  limits	  that	  cannot	  be	  imposed	  upon	  the	  abstract	  idea	  of	  “disease.”	  Their	  distinct	  humanity	  and	  emotion,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  inability	  to	  destroy	  a	  population	  like	  an	  epidemic	  does,	  are	  just	  a	  few	  differences	  overlooked	  by	  imposing	  disease	  onto	  the	  sick.	  	  By	  melding	  invisible	  molecular	  infiltrators	  with	  diseased	  citizens,	  an	  unreasonable,	  yet	  present,	  boundary	  is	  imposed	  between	  HIV	  positive	  and	  HIV	  negative	  individuals.	  In	  attempting	  to	  understand	  and	  localize	  disease,	  people	  afflicted	  with	  a	  disorder	  are	  also	  subjected	  to	  something	  Foucault	  calls	  the	  “medical	  gaze”	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(Foucault	  9).	  They	  are	  dehumanized,	  becoming	  no	  more	  than	  a	  template	  through	  which	  a	  disease	  can	  be	  viewed.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  ostracized	  at	  great	  length	  by	  society,	  people	  in	  this	  
othered	  HIV/AIDS	  category	  are	  also	  fenced	  in	  by	  humanly	  created	  boundaries.	  This	  construction	  thus	  serves	  to	  keep	  healthy,	  “normal”	  people	  out	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  further	  boxes	  the	  diseased	  in	  along	  with	  their	  symptoms.	  And	  the	  worse	  these	  symptoms	  are,	  the	  more	  impregnable	  are	  the	  walls	  that	  the	  healthy	  population	  seeks	  to	  construct.	  This	  extreme	  case	  of	  othering	  is	  what	  was	  applied	  to	  people	  in	  the	  HIV	  positive	  community	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Not	  only	  were	  these	  people	  doomed	  to	  die,	  they	  would	  also	  suffer	  psychosocial	  exile	  as	  their	  bodies	  degenerated.	  The	  method	  of	  this	  degeneration	  wasn’t	  clear,	  so	  the	  ambiguity	  in	  their	  future	  symptoms	  served	  to	  add	  even	  more	  reason	  to	  mentally	  separate	  them	  from	  the	  healthy	  population.	  	  Specifically	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  people	  afflicted	  with	  HIV/AIDS,	  the	  moment	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  a	  time	  when	  questions	  arise	  about	  consequences	  of	  past	  actions	  relevant	  to	  the	  disorder.	  Such	  a	  moment	  is	  outlined	  in	  Mark	  Doty’s	  
Heaven’s	  Coast,	  when	  Mark	  and	  Wally	  learn	  that	  Wally	  is	  HIV	  positive,	  while	  Mark	  is	  not.	  The	  story	  is	  told	  as	  if	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  both	  Mark	  and	  Wally	  together,	  and	  upon	  hearing	  the	  news	  they	  were	  struck	  with	  a	  “sense	  of	  an	  enormous	  rupture”	  by	  this	  “fundamentally	  inadmissible,	  unacceptable”	  announcement	  (Heaven’s	  Coast	  140).	  The	  description	  of	  their	  response	  is	  important—the	  news	  being	  initially	  “unacceptable”	  shows	  the	  mindset	  that	  this	  turn	  of	  events	  defies	  a	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  view	  of	  their	  world.	  The	  news	  is	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“fundamentally	  inadmissible”	  because	  for	  them,	  their	  karma	  doesn’t	  add	  up	  to	  this	  new	  reality.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  way	  the	  “enormous	  rupture”	  is	  in	  their	  just,	  causational	  view	  of	  the	  world	  which	  has	  been	  torn	  apart	  by	  the	  initial	  diagnosis.	  The	  world	  is	  now	  “wildly	  unfamiliar,”	  as	  Mark	  and	  Wally	  cannot	  believe	  that	  they	  could	  be	  struck	  with	  such	  terrible	  news,	  which	  they	  feel	  defies	  the	  benevolent	  lives	  they	  have	  led	  (Heaven’s	  Coast	  141).	  As	  much	  as	  Mark	  may	  try	  to	  believe	  otherwise,	  the	  diagnostic	  frame	  has	  encased	  Wally	  and	  Wally	  alone.	  It	  has	  created	  a	  separation	  between	  Mark	  and	  Wally,	  a	  distinction	  between	  caretaker	  and	  afflicted.	  No	  matter	  how	  close	  a	  caretaker	  gets,	  physically	  or	  emotionally,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  never	  be	  the	  person	  with	  AIDS	  in	  this	  dynamic.	  This	  new	  relationship	  is	  immediately	  imposed	  by	  the	  diagnosis.	  One	  explanation	  for	  Mark	  predicting	  that	  the	  future	  will	  be	  “wildly	  unfamiliar”	  is	  because	  he	  realizes	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  has	  sentenced	  him	  to	  a	  future	  of	  caring	  and	  empathizing,	  but	  never	  truly	  existing	  as	  Wally’s	  equal.	  Diagnosis	  thus	  has	  undeniable	  and	  permanent	  effects	  the	  moment	  it	  is	  spoken	  into	  existence,	  due	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  render	  a	  once-­‐equal	  relationship	  into	  one	  of	  caring	  and	  receiving,	  of	  giving	  and	  taking.	  	  In	  an	  interesting	  dynamic,	  the	  imposing	  of	  the	  frame	  of	  HIV	  positive	  onto	  Wally	  drastically	  shifted	  the	  way	  Wally	  and	  Mark	  viewed	  their	  world.	  Especially	  in	  these	  early	  years	  of	  the	  epidemic,	  very	  little	  was	  known	  about	  how	  the	  disease	  worked.	  A	  void	  in	  understanding	  exactly	  how	  the	  disorder	  was	  transmitted	  and	  wreaked	  havoc	  from	  the	  inside	  outwards	  stoked	  the	  desire	  to	  delve	  into	  questions	  of	  whether	  one’s	  actions	  had	  directly	  caused	  their	  affliction,	  as	  the	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exact	  cause	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  had	  remained	  elusive	  to	  scientists.	  Mark	  is	  struck	  by	  such	  a	  plethora	  of	  questions,	  wondering	  if	  some	  people	  were	  “naturally	  resistant”	  and	  how	  he	  didn’t	  have	  the	  disorder	  when	  he	  and	  Wally	  had	  engaged	  in	  “unsafe	  sex	  countless	  times”	  (Heaven’s	  Coast	  141).	  For	  him,	  the	  sudden	  diagnostic	  presence	  accentuates	  the	  innate	  human	  desire	  to	  find	  moral	  causality	  for	  the	  state	  of	  the	  surrounding	  world.	  In	  a	  sense,	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  HIV	  infection	  is	  a	  forceful	  and	  communal	  one.	  As	  Sander	  Gilman	  posits,	  “AIDS	  is	  a	  disease	  that	  evokes	  past	  casualties”	  (Gilman	  7).	  This	  perspective	  of	  AIDS	  stems	  from	  the	  constant,	  terrifying	  presence	  AIDS	  had	  in	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  American	  culture	  when	  it	  first	  emerged	  as	  an	  unknown	  threat.	  Driven	  by	  the	  enduring	  goal	  of	  delivering	  the	  most	  sensational	  news	  possible,	  the	  media	  conveyed	  images	  of	  people	  with	  AIDS	  that	  purposefully	  emphasized	  the	  physical	  and	  mental	  suffering	  of	  people	  afflicted	  with	  the	  disease.	  So	  when	  they	  heard	  the	  phrase	  “HIV	  positive”	  drop	  from	  their	  doctor’s	  lips,	  Wally	  and	  Mark	  would	  likely	  have	  immediately	  thought	  of	  the	  “past	  casualties”	  they	  associated	  with	  AIDS,	  both	  of	  its	  horrifying	  presentation	  by	  the	  media	  as	  well	  as	  any	  personal	  heartbreak	  they	  had	  experienced	  with	  the	  disorder	  among	  friends	  and	  family	  affected	  by	  the	  disorder.	  The	  moment	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  imposition	  of	  these	  images	  of	  suffering	  onto	  the	  currently	  healthy	  HIV	  positive	  patient,	  leading	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  vulnerability	  on	  the	  patient’s	  part.	  The	  diction	  of	  this	  scene	  also	  emphasizes	  the	  permanence	  of	  the	  HIV	  frame	  in	  which	  Wally	  is	  suddenly	  enclosed.	  A	  “rupture”	  is	  never	  simply	  sealed,	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even	  with	  time—use	  of	  this	  word	  implies	  there	  is	  no	  going	  back	  to	  the	  previous,	  whole	  self	  that	  was	  Wally.	  This	  permanent,	  destructive	  term	  is	  also	  applied	  to	  the	  boundaries	  Wally	  and	  Mark	  held	  between	  themselves	  and	  illness,	  separating	  them	  from	  death.	  They	  may	  have	  never	  before	  considered	  such	  borders,	  but	  the	  acute	  and	  unexpected	  “shattering”	  of	  these	  boundaries	  has	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  impact,	  leaving	  no	  room	  for	  pretense	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  death	  in	  their	  future	  (Doty	  140).	  The	  world	  is	  now	  “wildly	  unfamiliar”	  as	  the	  frame	  of	  HIV,	  and	  eventually	  of	  AIDS,	  will	  envelop	  Wally	  until	  his	  death.	  The	  experience	  of	  diagnosis	  has	  forced	  this	  realization	  onto	  both	  Mark	  and	  Wally.	  	  Interestingly,	  hidden	  in	  Doty’s	  proclaimed	  disastrous	  shock	  of	  the	  moment,	  he	  admits	  it	  was	  “not	  a	  surprise”	  (140).	  This	  lone	  admission	  must	  be	  founded	  in	  reality;	  a	  gay	  man	  like	  Wally	  falling	  suddenly	  sick	  in	  this	  period	  was	  a	  massive	  red	  flag	  that	  couldn’t	  have	  gone	  unnoticed	  by	  both	  Mark	  and	  Wally,	  both	  logical	  and	  practically	  minded	  about	  the	  world	  around	  them.	  This	  tiny	  inclusion	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  un-­‐ignorable	  magnanimity	  of	  an	  HIV	  diagnosis	  at	  this	  time	  in	  history.	  We	  all	  possess	  the	  centuries-­‐old	  concept	  of	  a	  diagnosis.	  This	  perception	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  inherent	  trust	  in	  the	  word	  of	  a	  medical	  expert,	  creating	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  reshape	  a	  patient’s	  perspectives	  towards	  illness	  and	  agency	  in	  their	  lives	  with	  a	  single	  declaration	  of	  a	  disorder’s	  name.	  The	  diagnosis	  is	  unforgettable,	  undeniable,	  and	  permanent.	  	  This	  realization	  sheds	  light	  on	  why	  Doty’s	  admission	  of	  prior	  knowledge,	  or	  at	  least	  suspicion,	  was	  so	  slight,	  hidden	  between	  weighty	  phrases	  like	  “enormous	  rupture”	  and	  “a	  horror”	  (140).	  Intriguing	  interpretations	  exist	  here,	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one	  being	  that	  Mark	  recognizes	  that	  while	  Wally’s	  agency	  will	  decline	  swiftly,	  Mark’s	  own	  potential	  remains	  unscathed,	  perhaps	  somewhat	  checked	  by	  his	  new	  role	  as	  caretaker.	  Returning	  to	  spatial	  metaphors,	  perhaps	  the	  boundaries	  separating	  Mark	  and	  Wally	  from	  illness	  and	  disintegration	  are	  not	  fully	  torn	  down.	  Instead,	  Wally’s	  diagnosis	  may	  place	  him	  firmly	  on	  the	  diseased	  side	  of	  the	  wall,	  and	  while	  Mark	  seeks	  to	  view	  himself	  as	  Wally’s	  equal,	  he	  is	  trapped	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  wall,	  the	  one	  with	  health	  and	  normality	  and	  no	  positive	  diagnosis.	  Mark’s	  apocalyptic	  diction	  then	  represents	  his	  response	  to	  Wally’s	  terrifying	  new	  location	  on	  the	  health-­‐to-­‐disorder	  spectrum,	  while	  Mark’s	  reluctance	  to	  admit	  his	  prior	  knowledge	  represents	  his	  understanding	  that	  Wally’s	  diagnosis	  creates	  an	  insurmountable	  rift	  between	  the	  two.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  if	  Mark	  can	  enter	  Wally’s	  space	  of	  isolation,	  he	  still	  retains	  the	  ability	  to	  leave	  the	  space	  to	  which	  Wally	  has	  been	  permanently	  exiled.	  The	  concept	  of	  space	  applied	  to	  Rebecca	  Brown’s	  Gifts	  of	  the	  Body	  allows	  for	  an	  interesting	  perspective	  on	  how	  AIDS	  maintains	  a	  physical	  presence	  around	  an	  afflicted	  individual.	  This	  presence	  includes	  both	  the	  space	  of	  the	  afflicted	  body	  as	  well	  as	  the	  space	  around	  the	  body,	  in	  which	  interactions	  between	  the	  diseased	  patient	  and	  other	  individuals	  take	  place.	  The	  very	  presence	  of	  Brown’s	  narrator,	  a	  hospice	  worker,	  around	  diseased	  individuals	  signifies	  their	  lack	  of	  agency	  and	  ability,	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  their	  constant	  helplessness.	  When	  asked	  how	  she	  is	  doing,	  one	  patient	  repeatedly	  responds	  with	  the	  simple	  phrase	  “I’m	  fine,	  I’m	  fine,”	  and	  every	  repetition	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  resist	  the	  sense	  that	  her	  role	  is	  not	  of	  a	  giver,	  but	  of	  a	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receiver	  of	  assistance	  (Brown	  53).	  As	  the	  narrator	  prepares	  to	  leave	  Ed’s	  apartment,	  he	  asks	  “why	  did	  you	  come	  here?”	  and	  when	  she	  responds	  “to	  see	  you,”	  Ed	  immediately	  asks	  “you	  didn’t	  have	  to?”	  (Brown	  73).	  These	  scenes,	  along	  with	  the	  images	  throughout	  this	  story	  of	  living	  rooms	  cluttered	  with	  intravenous-­‐bag	  poles,	  pills,	  and	  medical	  machinery,	  reveals	  the	  striking	  shift	  in	  the	  living	  space	  of	  an	  AIDS	  patient.	  As	  medical	  paraphernalia	  builds	  up	  following	  AIDS	  symptoms,	  the	  space	  of	  a	  home	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  lived	  hospital,	  an	  area	  in	  which	  the	  maintenance	  of	  health	  is	  the	  focal	  point,	  instead	  of	  the	  comfort	  of	  living.	  Embarrassed	  about	  a	  condom	  catheter,	  another	  patient	  explains	  that	  “everything	  new	  is	  something	  else	  you’ve	  lost”	  (Brown	  42).	  Viewing	  this	  statement	  through	  a	  spatial	  lens,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  physical	  space	  around	  a	  person	  afflicted	  with	  AIDS	  becomes	  more	  stifling	  with	  every	  change.	  The	  experience	  of	  AIDS	  is	  one	  involving	  a	  constant	  medical	  presence,	  and	  the	  appearance	  of	  this	  presence	  removes	  comfort	  and	  relaxation	  from	  an	  individual’s	  personal	  space.	  	   Other	  spaces	  play	  roles	  in	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  AIDS,	  such	  as	  the	  waiting	  room	  in	  R.	  S.	  Jones’	  Walking	  on	  Air.	  Everyone	  in	  the	  room	  waits	  to	  see	  the	  doctor,	  an	  AIDS	  specialist,	  and	  they	  are	  all	  aware	  of	  their	  commonality:	  the	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  they	  share.	  But	  what	  does	  awareness	  do	  to	  this	  physical	  space?	  Immediately	  upon	  entering	  the	  waiting	  room,	  William,	  a	  patient,	  studies	  “the	  faces	  around	  him	  for	  signs	  of	  deterioration,”	  as	  they	  view	  each	  other	  as	  “reflections	  of	  their	  own	  disintegration”	  (Jones	  59).	  Each	  patient	  arrives	  surrounded	  by	  an	  aura	  of	  deteriorating	  health,	  which	  is	  magnified	  by	  their	  collective	  presence	  waiting	  to	  see	  a	  medical	  professional	  and	  validated	  by	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crumbling	  word	  choice	  such	  as	  “deterioration”	  and	  “disintegration.”	  But	  these	  patients	  are	  not	  just	  mirrors	  of	  each	  other’s	  symptoms.	  William	  feels	  “entombed	  by	  their	  contagion,”	  which	  adds	  an	  interesting	  dynamic	  to	  this	  discussion	  of	  space	  (Jones	  60).	  Although	  William	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  “contagion”	  that	  makes	  him	  feel	  deathly	  restricted,	  one	  wonders	  whether	  it	  is	  his	  own	  mortality.	  	  William	  already	  has	  the	  disorder,	  and	  what	  is	  more,	  he	  understands	  that	  methods	  of	  contracting	  AIDS	  are	  very	  specific	  and	  intimate.	  In	  reality,	  William	  feels	  “entombed”	  because	  by	  being	  located	  near	  other	  AIDS	  patients,	  he	  notices	  their	  surrounding	  spaces	  are	  inscribed	  with	  evidence	  of	  pain	  and	  anguish,	  “pale	  with	  imminent	  death”	  (Jones	  60).	  So	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  their	  symptoms	  that	  these	  AIDS	  patients	  see	  reflected	  in	  others	  with	  the	  disorder.	  They	  also	  recognize	  that	  their	  subtle	  interactions	  with	  each	  other—quick	  glances	  and	  greetings—revolve	  around	  their	  battles	  with	  AIDS.	  They	  realize	  that	  their	  own	  situations	  are	  the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  the	  other	  patients	  in	  the	  waiting	  room,	  and	  that	  their	  common	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  changes	  their	  spaces	  into	  ones	  of	  mortal	  struggle.	  Thus,	  these	  patients	  are	  reminded	  of	  the	  morbid	  character	  of	  the	  spaces	  they	  themselves	  inhabit,	  and	  this	  knowledge	  leads	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  entombment,	  a	  space	  those	  diagnosed	  with	  AIDS	  inhabit	  until	  death.	  The	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  removes	  a	  person’s	  control	  over	  his	  or	  her	  image	  and	  personal	  space,	  changing	  what	  was	  once	  owned	  by	  the	  patient	  into	  an	  area	  constructed	  by	  a	  viewer	  searching	  for	  signs	  of	  illness.	  	  	   The	  main	  character’s	  experience	  in	  Brown’s	  work	  highlights	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  diseased	  space	  around	  AIDS	  patients.	  Upon	  first	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viewing	  a	  patient,	  the	  narrator	  immediately	  notes	  that	  he	  was	  the	  “scariest”	  to	  look	  at,	  that	  he	  “really	  looked	  like	  the	  plague”	  (Brown	  117).	  Kristeva’s	  concept	  of	  the	  abject	  and	  its	  role	  in	  human	  perspective	  on	  disease	  serves	  to	  illuminate	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  sores	  to	  dominate	  the	  aura,	  and	  character,	  of	  an	  AIDS	  patient.	  The	  narrator	  focuses	  in	  upon	  quarter	  sized,	  “dark	  purple”	  sores	  covering	  the	  patient’s	  body,	  and	  this	  description	  is	  swiftly	  followed	  by	  an	  image	  of	  his	  “dark	  brown”	  skin.	  This	  colorful	  imagery	  is	  purposeful;	  contrasting	  of	  the	  “purple”	  sores	  with	  the	  “dark	  brown”	  skin	  represents	  another	  contrast	  that	  shapes	  the	  experience	  of	  AIDS	  patients,	  that	  of	  inhuman	  symptoms	  emanating	  from	  a	  human	  body.	  Although	  originating	  from	  a	  man,	  these	  sores	  are	  distinctly	  non-­‐human,	  unmistakably	  purple	  to	  the	  dark	  brown	  of	  his	  human	  skin.	  The	  competing	  presence	  of	  both	  human	  and	  abject	  is	  flung	  in	  the	  observer’s	  face.	  The	  condition	  of	  AIDS	  is	  thus	  framed	  here	  as	  one	  in	  which	  careful	  study	  must	  be	  applied	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  dying	  and	  the	  living	  aspects	  of	  a	  patient’s	  body.	  The	  sores	  and	  lesions	  act	  as	  evidence	  of	  morbidity	  written	  upon	  a	  patient’s	  skin,	  etching	  a	  sense	  of	  lifelessness	  onto	  the	  afflicted,	  who	  are	  still	  very	  much	  alive.	  So	  the	  perspective	  of	  AIDS	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  unique	  and	  terrible	  insinuation	  that	  the	  afflicted	  live	  with	  death.	  	  	   The	  physical	  line	  between	  man	  and	  sore	  is	  a	  focus	  of	  this	  horrible	  fascination,	  as	  the	  caretaker	  in	  Gifts	  of	  the	  Body	  specifically	  describes	  the	  “yellow	  …	  edges”	  between	  sore	  and	  man.	  This	  client	  is	  “scariest”	  to	  look	  at	  because	  his	  clearly	  visible	  symptoms	  force	  the	  narrator	  to	  consider	  the	  line	  between	  human	  and	  abject.	  Brown’s	  choice	  of	  “yellow”	  as	  the	  color	  of	  this	  border	  is	  significant,	  as	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yellow	  often	  conjures	  notions	  of	  sickliness,	  or	  a	  humanity	  somewhat	  removed	  from	  health.	  Fascination	  in	  the	  line-­‐drawing	  between	  man	  and	  sore	  leads	  the	  narrator	  to	  find	  that	  the	  boundary	  is	  far	  fuzzier	  than	  expected.	  This	  is	  emblemized	  by	  the	  color	  yellow,	  which	  is	  non-­‐human	  yet	  only	  a	  few	  shades	  away	  from	  the	  hue	  of	  healthy	  skin.	  The	  stark	  realization	  of	  the	  blurriness	  of	  this	  line	  between	  humanity	  and	  the	  abject	  is	  terrifying.	  	  Viewing	  this	  boundary’s	  impermanence,	  we	  might	  imagine	  ourselves	  slipping	  into	  the	  non-­‐human	  other,	  and	  we	  “give	  birth	  to	  [ourselves]	  amid	  the	  violence	  of	  sobs,	  of	  vomit”	  (Kristeva	  3).	  The	  emotion	  seen	  in	  Kristeva’s	  gut-­‐wrenching	  phrasing	  is	  the	  reality	  of	  someone	  living	  with	  AIDS’	  image.	  In	  Jones’	  
Walking	  on	  Air,	  the	  main	  character	  describes	  lesions	  on	  a	  patient	  as	  “leeches,”	  that	  were	  “travel[ing]	  across	  his	  skin”	  (60).	  Here,	  the	  abject	  isn’t	  just	  lifeless—it	  is	  an	  actual	  creature.	  The	  choice	  of	  animal	  is	  purposeful,	  as	  the	  blood-­‐sucking	  leech	  has	  a	  predatory	  aspect	  to	  it.	  Here,	  AIDS	  has	  transformed	  this	  patient’s	  space	  into	  one	  of	  mortal	  battle,	  fighting	  to	  hold	  onto	  one’s	  lifeblood.	  With	  an	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  comes	  a	  license	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  partially	  human,	  partially	  abject,	  and	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  shift	  in	  ownership	  of	  space	  and	  perspective.	  Beyond	  the	  caretaker’s	  first	  reaction	  to	  a	  specific	  patient’s	  appearance,	  Brown	  chooses	  to	  devote	  a	  full	  page	  of	  vivid	  language	  to	  this	  man’s	  sores	  and	  corresponding	  salve,	  while	  never	  mentioning	  the	  client’s	  name.	  Brown	  chooses	  to	  omit	  this	  character’s	  name	  because	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  narrator,	  she	  isn’t	  working	  with	  a	  patient;	  her	  role	  is	  to	  work	  with	  his	  sores.	  His	  AIDS-­‐induced	  sores	  haven’t	  necessarily	  taken	  his	  name,	  but	  they	  have	  re-­‐structured	  his	  natural	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human	  hierarchy,	  and	  his	  sores	  are	  more	  characterizing	  of	  his	  being	  than	  his	  own	  name.	  She	  also	  isn’t	  working	  in	  the	  space	  of	  his	  home,	  she	  is	  working	  in	  a	  zone	  of	  medical	  salve	  and	  symptomatic	  AIDS.	  The	  experience	  of	  inhabiting	  this	  zone	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  description	  of	  where	  her	  eyes	  focus	  while	  applying	  salve	  to	  the	  sores.	  Actually	  “touching	  the	  body,”	  she	  has	  delved	  deep	  into	  the	  client’s	  space	  (Brown	  121).	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  her	  client’s	  presence	  directly	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  she	  asks	  him	  about	  an	  exotic	  African	  painting	  above	  his	  bed,	  responding	  to	  the	  uncomfortable	  experience	  of	  being	  so	  immersed	  in	  an	  AIDS-­‐afflicted	  zone	  by	  seeking	  to	  mentally	  travel	  to	  far-­‐away	  Africa.	  Embodied	  in	  his	  uncomfortable	  physical	  space,	  this	  man’s	  diagnosis	  and	  his	  symptoms	  have	  covered	  his	  original	  identity.	  This	  is	  a	  new	  concept	  in	  this	  chapter’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  frame	  of	  an	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  the	  ideological	  borders	  standing	  between	  someone	  and	  their	  mortality	  that	  are	  restructured	  with	  an	  AIDS	  diagnosis.	  Additionally,	  their	  self,	  at	  least	  as	  perceived	  by	  others,	  is	  eroded	  away	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  physical	  symptoms.	  In	  a	  sense,	  these	  people	  are	  known	  before	  they	  are	  met—their	  identity	  as	  an	  HIV	  positive	  individual	  creates	  a	  personality	  in	  the	  beholder	  that	  may	  reflect	  nothing	  of	  their	  actual	  character.	  For	  example,	  the	  patient	  mentioned	  above	  is	  reduced	  to	  a	  battle	  between	  man	  and	  creature,	  human	  and	  leech	  (over	  the	  possession	  of	  blood).	  To	  expand	  upon	  this	  experience	  of	  being	  known	  before	  having	  met	  someone,	  Brown	  introduces	  Roy.	  An	  elevator	  attendant	  in	  a	  client’s	  building,	  Roy	  knows	  the	  narrator’s	  name	  before	  he	  ever	  saw	  her	  face,	  and	  this	  experience	  was	  beyond	  just	  “weird”	  (Brown	  88).	  This	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image	  juxtaposes	  the	  previous	  scene	  of	  the	  caretaker	  applying	  salve	  to	  a	  client,	  as	  here	  the	  elevator	  serves	  as	  the	  space	  in	  which	  one’s	  identity	  precedes	  their	  actual	  presence.	  Roy	  imposes	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  identity	  upon	  the	  caretaker	  in	  the	  confined	  space	  of	  the	  elevator,	  leaving	  the	  caretaker	  very	  uncomfortable.	  The	  full	  five	  pages	  spent	  on	  the	  brief	  scene	  between	  the	  narrator	  and	  Roy	  also	  emphasize	  the	  strikingly	  uncomfortable	  nature	  of	  this	  dynamic.	  	  This	  serves	  to	  emphasize	  the	  tensions	  AIDS	  patients	  feel,	  knowing	  they	  are	  preceded	  by	  an	  identity	  separate	  from	  their	  own.	  Living	  in	  a	  social	  culture,	  we	  take	  solace	  in	  our	  right	  to	  shape	  how	  we	  are	  seen	  by	  others.	  But	  this	  right	  is	  stripped	  away,	  or	  more	  exactly	  it	  is	  overshadowed,	  by	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis.	  The	  experience	  of	  this	  diagnostic	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  label	  of	  HIV	  or	  AIDS	  seems	  so	  important	  and	  weighty	  that	  it	  overshadows	  the	  societal	  expectation	  that	  one	  shouldn’t	  judge	  someone	  else	  by	  their	  appearances,	  that	  you	  can’t	  know	  someone	  until	  they	  are	  met.	  The	  diagnosis	  removes,	  in	  a	  way,	  those	  carrying	  its	  label	  from	  the	  social	  expectations	  and	  rules	  of	  interaction	  our	  society	  is	  constructed	  around.	  	  Brown’s	  narrator’s	  horror	  at	  abjection,	  simultaneously	  personified	  in	  her	  client	  while	  removing	  his	  humanness,	  leads	  to	  statements	  like	  “everyone	  who	  gets	  it	  [HIV/AIDS]	  didn’t	  have	  it	  once”	  (Brown	  139).	  This	  statement’s	  importance	  lies	  in	  its	  very	  existence—once	  AIDS	  has	  claimed	  an	  identity,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  forget	  that	  at	  one	  point,	  this	  person’s	  name	  and	  personality	  held	  claim	  over	  their	  identity.	  In	  his	  photographic	  work	  People	  with	  AIDS,	  Nicholas	  Nixon	  attempts	  to	  tell	  the	  stories	  of	  fifteen	  people	  afflicted	  with	  AIDS	  to	  attempt	  to	  reclaim	  these	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lost	  identities.	  Yet	  although	  each	  patient	  looks	  unique	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  chronological	  photo	  series,	  the	  images	  at	  the	  end	  provide	  no	  such	  distinction.	  The	  gaunt	  face	  suspended	  above	  a	  stark	  collarbone,	  holding	  on	  to	  fragile	  arms,	  appears	  at	  the	  end	  of	  every	  story.	  This	  terrible	  reducing	  quality	  of	  AIDS	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  afflicted,	  and	  Tom	  Petchkiss	  seeks	  to	  argue	  against	  it,	  stating	  “I	  still	  look	  pretty	  good.	  Not	  like	  your	  typical	  AIDS	  patient,	  anyway	  …	  I	  just	  don’t	  think	  I	  fit	  any	  preconceived	  notion	  of	  what	  sick	  people	  look	  like”	  (2).	  Although	  Tom	  may	  not	  mirror	  the	  reduced,	  gaunt	  image	  of	  AIDS	  yet,	  this	  image	  still	  exists	  clearly	  in	  his	  mind.	  Thoughts	  like	  these	  show	  that	  the	  process	  of	  living	  with	  diagnosis	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  inevitable	  sense	  that	  one	  will	  lose	  their	  individuality.	  This	  stems	  somewhat	  from	  representations	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  in	  the	  media,	  where	  the	  afflicted	  inhabit	  the	  “classical	  iconographic	  position	  of	  melancholy”	  (Gilman	  259).	  Tom	  knows	  that	  visual	  markers	  of	  AIDS	  will	  come	  to	  strip	  him	  away,	  and	  he	  is	  consciously	  attempting	  to	  resist	  this	  expected	  reduction	  to	  the	  image	  of	  the	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  itself.	  	   So	  even	  before	  Tom’s	  appearance	  has	  taken	  priority	  over	  his	  self,	  he	  fears	  that	  it	  will.	  This	  is	  what	  accompanies	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnostic	  frame,	  a	  deeply	  feared,	  yet	  profoundly	  known,	  fact	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  places	  not	  only	  a	  time	  limit	  on	  one’s	  life,	  but	  also	  upon	  one’s	  perceived	  identity.	  Through	  these	  abjection-­‐fueled	  frames	  of	  people	  with	  AIDS,	  the	  experience	  of	  an	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  becomes	  one	  of	  fearing	  both	  physical	  and	  social	  disintegration.	  As	  the	  boundaries	  between	  one’s	  self	  and	  illness	  and	  mortality	  lower,	  one’s	  personal	  identity	  diminishes.	  Maybe	  these	  actual	  boundaries	  aren’t	  destroyed;	  instead,	  returning	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to	  spatial	  perspectives,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  that	  an	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis	  shifts	  one’s	  location	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  boundaries	  that	  includes	  mortality	  and	  abjection,	  and	  excludes	  power	  and	  agency	  over	  social	  identity.	  Norman	  Sanger,	  in	  My	  Own	  
Country,	  lived	  his	  whole	  live	  characterized	  by	  two	  traits,	  “courage	  and	  dignity”	  (Verghese	  340).	  Yet	  the	  personality	  he	  had	  built	  to	  fight	  his	  hemophilia	  disorder	  was	  torn	  down	  by	  the	  frame	  of	  AIDS.	  His	  fear	  was	  revealed	  through	  his	  confiding	  in	  Verghese	  that	  “last	  night,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  I	  was	  a	  little	  boy,	  I	  wondered	  whether	  I	  could	  keep	  it	  up,	  whether	  this	  disease	  would	  make	  me	  lose	  it	  all?”	  (Verghese	  340).	  Norman’s	  identity	  was	  restructured,	  and	  he	  became	  a	  “little	  boy”	  again,	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  social	  and	  personal	  view	  of	  himself	  that	  he	  clung	  to	  his	  entire	  life.	  	  A	  specific	  experience	  of	  the	  caretaker	  in	  Gifts	  of	  the	  Body	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  hierarchical	  reordering	  of	  an	  AIDS	  patient’s	  identity.	  While	  simultaneously	  applying	  salve	  to	  a	  patient’s	  sores	  and	  conversing	  about	  a	  patient’s	  past,	  she	  notes	  that	  “it	  was	  like	  there	  were	  four	  people	  there,”	  two	  people	  “having	  a	  normal	  conversation”	  and	  one	  person	  “touching	  the	  body	  with	  the	  salve”	  and	  another	  “with	  the	  body	  with	  the	  sores”	  (Brown	  121).	  This	  speaks	  to	  the	  narrator’s	  struggle	  to	  navigate	  a	  sick	  man’s	  physical	  space.	  She	  views	  this	  zone	  as	  one	  of	  having	  and	  battling	  against	  illness,	  creating	  the	  dynamic	  of	  touching	  the	  body’s	  sores	  with	  the	  salve.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  normal	  conversation	  the	  two	  are	  having	  shifts	  the	  dynamic	  to	  one	  not	  involving	  health,	  one	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  “normal.”	  This	  excerpt	  posits	  that	  although	  the	  struggle	  with	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AIDS	  may	  take	  dominance	  of	  someone’s	  image,	  humanity	  still	  remains,	  sometimes	  surprisingly.	  	  The	  casual	  diction	  of	  Brown’s	  narrator	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  unique	  and	  divisive	  idea	  she	  posits.	  She	  uses	  phrases	  like	  “part	  of	  it	  felt	  good”	  and	  “normal”	  as	  well	  as	  repetition	  of	  words	  like	  “conversation”	  and	  “body,”	  a	  simple	  word	  choice	  (Brown	  121).	  And	  in	  addition	  to	  this	  colloquial	  nature	  and	  structure,	  the	  discussion	  of	  a	  psychosocial	  split	  is	  brief,	  lasting	  only	  three	  sentences	  before	  moving	  onto	  the	  patient’s	  life	  before	  diagnosis.	  Here,	  the	  narrative	  itself	  is	  consciously	  structured	  as	  a	  space,	  one	  in	  which	  simple,	  brief	  diction	  and	  description	  seem	  to	  highlight	  the	  narrator’s	  distress.	  More	  precisely,	  this	  narrative	  space	  emphasizes	  the	  uncomfortable,	  hidden	  nature	  of	  this	  split	  in	  psychosocial	  perspective.	  In	  getting	  so	  close	  to	  the	  patient,	  the	  narrator	  must	  address	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  a	  patient	  to	  his	  symptomatic	  struggles,	  and	  her	  issues	  accepting	  this	  are	  echoed	  in	  the	  story’s	  discordant	  narrational	  structure	  itself.	  	   Although	  most	  illness	  narratives	  focus	  upon	  the	  experience	  of	  living	  with	  a	  disorder,	  many	  also	  contain	  important	  clues	  about	  someone’s	  life	  before	  the	  disorder.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HIV/AIDS,	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  clues	  lies	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  someone’s	  life	  preceding	  diagnosis.	  This	  technique	  can	  be	  used	  in	  Nixon’s	  People	  with	  AIDS	  to	  illuminate	  a	  temporal	  aspect	  of	  the	  AIDS	  diagnosis,	  juxtaposing	  a	  patient’s	  mindset	  before	  and	  after	  HIV	  appeared	  in	  his	  or	  her	  life.	  Tom	  Petchkiss	  states	  that	  “before	  I	  was	  sick,	  I	  never	  would	  have	  considered	  a	  project	  like	  this	  one	  …	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  medical	  insensitivity”	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(Nixon	  2).	  Because	  HIV	  was	  an	  incurable	  disorder	  in	  the	  1980s,	  a	  diagnosis	  was	  in	  a	  way	  a	  death	  sentence.	  Statements	  like	  Tom’s	  were	  prevalent	  in	  HIV/AIDS	  literature,	  because	  an	  HIV	  or	  AIDS	  diagnosis	  was,	  at	  its	  heart,	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  ticking	  clock.	  This	  quantification	  of	  one’s	  future	  begins	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  doctor	  answers	  the	  “how	  long	  do	  I	  have	  to	  live”	  question.	  Because	  of	  the	  inherent	  life-­‐changing	  aspect	  of	  a	  terminal	  diagnosis,	  the	  life	  of	  someone	  afflicted	  is	  split	  into	  two	  temporal	  zones;	  the	  before,	  a	  time	  of	  health	  and	  normality,	  and	  the	  “harrowing,	  forward-­‐pouring	  next,”	  when	  a	  person	  is	  identified	  primarily	  as	  a	  patient,	  surrounded	  by	  a	  medical	  and	  degenerative	  sphere	  (Doty	  140).	  	  This	  splitting	  of	  one’s	  lifetime	  into	  “before”	  and	  “after”	  results	  in	  an	  unexpected	  and	  confusing	  split	  in	  identity.	  If	  one’s	  life	  is	  split	  in	  two,	  then	  in	  some	  sense	  the	  life	  was	  lived	  by	  two	  separate	  people.	  This	  sentiment	  is	  captured	  in	  Tom	  Petchkiss’	  struggle	  to	  tell	  his	  own	  story,	  as	  he	  states	  that	  “I	  was	  …	  I	  am	  an	  actor”	  (Nixon	  2).	  This	  slip-­‐up	  echoes	  an	  internal	  conflict	  within	  Tom	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  tendency	  to	  view	  his	  post-­‐diagnosis	  identity	  as	  distinct	  from	  pre-­‐diagnosis.	  Perhaps	  times	  of	  health	  and	  work	  appear	  so	  foreign	  to	  the	  afflicted	  that	  although	  they	  may	  have	  occurred	  recently,	  they	  are	  viewed	  as	  if	  they	  are	  someone	  else’s	  memories.	  Tom’s	  tone,	  seen	  in	  the	  italicized	  “am,”	  shows	  his	  passionate	  response	  to	  this	  imposed	  separation	  of	  his	  once-­‐unified	  identity.	  This	  temporal	  division	  is	  an	  uncomfortable	  reality,	  shown	  in	  Tom’s	  ardent	  attempts	  to	  resist	  it.	  In	  his	  New	  Yorker	  essay	  The	  Way	  I	  Live	  Now,	  HIV/AIDS	  patient	  and	  writer	  David	  Leavitt	  elucidates	  the	  exact	  psychosocial	  effects	  of	  this	  new	  identity’s	  presence.	  He	  notes	  that	  many	  gay	  writers	  didn’t	  write	  on	  the	  epidemic	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until	  in	  “the	  panicked	  wake	  of	  diagnosis”	  (Leavitt).	  Diagnosis	  here	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  destructive	  event,	  leaving	  a	  “wake”	  behind	  it.	  It	  is	  a	  loud	  and	  dangerous	  incident,	  almost	  like	  a	  natural	  disaster.	  The	  choice	  of	  “panicked”	  fits	  in	  with	  this	  idea,	  showing	  that	  the	  post-­‐diagnosis	  identity	  is,	  at	  least	  initially,	  a	  frantic	  and	  pressured	  experience.	  Although	  we	  all	  recognize	  that	  our	  time	  is	  limited,	  diagnosis	  changes	  this	  by	  not	  only	  accelerating	  the	  clock,	  but	  also	  making	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  ticking	  motion	  towards	  death	  much	  more	  obvious.	  	  The	  chaotic	  effects	  of	  this	  omnipresent	  clock	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  sentence	  structure	  and	  diction	  of	  Susan	  Sontag’s	  The	  Way	  We	  Live	  Now.	  The	  sentences	  are	  jarringly	  long	  and	  riddled	  with	  commas	  and	  clauses,	  echoing	  the	  frantic	  and	  bouncing	  stream	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  someone	  recently	  diagnosed.	  Perhaps	  much	  of	  this	  mental	  turmoil	  results	  directly	  from	  confusion	  over	  the	  main	  character’s	  fractured	  temporal	  identity.	  HIs	  revelation	  is	  that	  post-­‐diagnosis,	  all	  one	  can	  do	  is	  “wait	  and	  hope,	  wait	  and	  start	  being	  careful”	  (Sontag	  8).	  	  The	  repetition	  of	  “wait”	  is	  seen	  throughout	  this	  section	  of	  the	  story,	  and	  shows	  a	  constant,	  looming	  presence	  of	  time	  in	  his	  perspective	  of	  his	  own	  reality.	  He	  also	  states	  that	  “becoming	  seriously	  ill	  was	  something	  that	  happened	  to	  other	  people,”	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  persona	  he	  now	  feels	  is	  something	  he	  doesn’t	  recognize,	  as	  he	  only	  ever	  saw	  or	  imagined	  its	  existence	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  others	  (Sontag	  8).	  Another,	  more	  encouraging	  perspective	  of	  the	  temporal	  aspect	  of	  an	  HIV/AIDS	  diagnosis	  exists	  in	  Nixon’s	  photographic	  work,	  one	  of	  devotion	  and	  rebirth.	  Tom	  Petchkiss’	  animated	  “I	  am	  an	  actor”	  indicates	  a	  passion	  missing	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from	  his	  pre-­‐diagnosis	  life.	  This	  perspective	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  an	  interesting	  statement	  Mark	  Doty	  makes	  in	  Heaven’s	  Coast,	  that	  AIDS	  acts	  as	  an	  “intensifier,	  something	  which	  makes	  things	  more	  firmly,	  deeply	  themselves”	  (Doty	  3).	  Perhaps	  the	  diagnostic	  expulsion	  of	  one’s	  past	  identity	  creates	  a	  chance	  to	  form	  a	  new	  character.	  Specifically,	  the	  pressure	  of	  time	  seems	  to	  exaggerate	  aspects	  of	  life	  that	  mean	  the	  most	  to	  the	  afflicted.	  The	  experience	  of	  diagnosis	  can	  be	  one	  of	  opportunity	  in	  a	  way.	  The	  writers	  David	  Leavitt	  references,	  although	  struggling	  with	  fear	  and	  confusion	  in	  the	  “panicked	  wake	  of	  diagnosis,”	  are	  galvanized	  to	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  write	  on	  this	  taboo	  topic.	  	  Susan	  Sontag	  both	  supports	  and	  complicates	  this	  notion	  in	  The	  Way	  We	  
Live	  Now,	  specifically	  in	  her	  portrayal	  of	  the	  main	  character’s	  choice	  to	  keep	  a	  daily	  journal.	  This	  diary	  was,	  in	  a	  way,	  a	  means	  of	  “slyly	  staking	  out	  his	  claim	  to	  a	  future	  time,”	  and	  “accumulating	  something	  to	  reread	  one	  day”	  (Sontag	  15).	  The	  choice	  to	  keep	  a	  diary	  is	  an	  example	  of	  re-­‐creation,	  of	  taking	  diagnosis	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reflects	  what	  matters	  most	  to	  the	  patient.	  Specifically,	  the	  diary	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  narrative	  to	  create	  one’s	  self	  anew.	  These	  written	  words	  are	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  patient,	  and	  the	  writing	  embodies	  his	  rebirth.	  Additionally,	  once	  diagnostically	  trapped	  in	  an	  identity	  scarce	  with	  time,	  the	  main	  character	  utilizes	  this	  diary	  to	  capture	  the	  fleeting	  present.	  In	  an	  interesting	  way,	  to	  battle	  a	  lack	  of	  time	  he	  chooses	  to	  encapsulate	  the	  time	  he	  does	  have.	  He	  now	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  access	  his	  past	  by	  simply	  opening	  up	  the	  diary	  at	  any	  moment,	  a	  newly	  accessible	  window	  into	  the	  past.	  Yet	  Sontag	  addresses	  the	  reality	  that	  this	  rebirth	  has	  a	  ceiling.	  As	  the	  physical	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symptoms	  of	  AIDS	  manifest,	  the	  handwriting	  becomes	  “less	  legible”	  in	  the	  more	  recent	  journal	  pages	  (Sontag	  15).	  This	  re-­‐creation	  and	  embodiment	  of	  self	  in	  the	  diary	  is	  temporary.	  The	  captured	  time	  in	  the	  diary	  is	  ultimately	  prone	  to	  AIDS	  symptoms	  of	  its	  own,	  becoming	  “spidery”	  as	  a	  patient’s	  mental	  state	  deteriorates	  (15).	  	   The	  temporally	  measured	  nature	  of	  the	  new,	  HIV/AIDS	  afflicted	  self	  is	  noticeable	  to	  those	  close	  to	  the	  afflicted.	  In	  Gifts	  of	  the	  Body,	  the	  caretaker	  learns	  that	  her	  boss,	  Margaret,	  contracted	  HIV	  and	  overhears	  her	  discussing	  plans	  for	  the	  “summer	  after	  next”	  at	  a	  work	  function	  (Brown	  146).	  The	  caretaker’s	  eyes	  suddenly	  “shot	  over”	  to	  Margaret,	  who	  saw	  her	  “wonder	  how	  long	  she	  had	  to	  live”	  (Brown	  147).	  This	  scene	  speaks	  to	  shifts	  in	  both	  the	  space	  of	  their	  work	  and	  the	  perceived	  identity	  of	  Margaret.	  The	  company	  office	  had	  become	  a	  reprieve	  from	  the	  daily	  presence	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  other	  illness	  encountered	  routinely	  by	  hospice	  workers.	  But	  the	  mere	  knowledge	  of	  Margaret’s	  diagnosis	  shifted	  this	  space	  noticeably.	  It	  wasn’t	  the	  risk	  of	  Margaret’s	  contagion	  that	  caused	  this	  change,	  as	  every	  healthcare	  worker	  present	  knows	  they	  aren’t	  at	  risk	  just	  standing	  near	  an	  infected	  individual.	  Margaret’s	  diagnosis	  has	  shifted	  her	  body,	  and	  the	  space	  around	  her,	  into	  a	  place	  to	  seek	  evidence	  of	  temporality	  and	  disintegration.	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  the	  medical	  gaze	  is	  useful	  in	  considering	  this	  context,	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  methods	  through	  which	  a	  sick	  individual	  is	  naturally	  viewed	  by	  somebody	  else.	  This	  “gaze”	  is	  naturally	  “analytic,”	  searching	  for	  signals	  of	  disease	  and	  naturally	  reducing	  a	  person	  to	  the	  object	  of	  a	  patient,	  to	  a	  “spectacle”	  at	  some	  level	  (Foucault	  109,	  108).	  Margaret	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has	  instantly	  become	  an	  object	  of	  Foucault’s	  medical	  gaze,	  which	  the	  main	  character	  is	  used	  to	  applying	  in	  her	  client’s	  homes,	  but	  is	  new	  to	  the	  hospice	  building’s	  space.	  	  Margaret’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  “summer	  after	  next”	  shocks	  the	  caretaker	  because	  that	  conversation	  defies	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  Margaret’s	  new	  space	  and	  identity.	  One	  sociological	  study	  seeking	  to	  describe	  reactions	  to	  AIDS	  found	  that	  the	  “key	  question	  PWAs	  [Persons	  With	  AIDS]	  asked	  was:	  ‘Will	  I	  be	  able	  to	  function	  tomorrow?’”	  (Weitz	  275).	  The	  prevalence	  of	  this	  question	  in	  that	  study	  stems	  directly	  from	  the	  temporal	  focus	  of	  the	  frame	  of	  HIV/AIDS.	  Those	  inhabiting	  this	  frame	  are	  often	  expected	  to	  exhibit	  a	  mindset	  in	  which	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  future	  leads	  to	  a	  single-­‐minded	  focus	  upon	  the	  present.	  Margaret’s	  engagement	  in	  discussion	  of	  the	  “summer	  after	  next”	  defies	  this	  expectation,	  and	  thus	  her	  diagnosis	  brings	  a	  temporal	  focus	  into	  the	  shared	  office	  space.	  Her	  terminal	  diagnosis	  has	  irreversibly	  placed	  ideas	  of	  the	  future	  into	  question,	  and	  as	  Sontag	  showed	  with	  her	  diary	  allegory,	  perhaps	  Margaret’s	  discussion	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  her	  own	  future,	  which	  has	  been	  taken	  from	  her	  by	  her	  sudden	  and	  unexpected	  diagnosis.	  Diagnosis,	  through	  contemporary	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  narratives,	  is	  seen	  to	  take	  on	  a	  persona	  of	  its	  own.	  It	  envelops	  human	  identities,	  both	  illuminates	  and	  alters	  the	  boundaries	  we	  erect	  psychologically	  between	  ourselves	  and	  our	  mortality,	  and	  imposes	  a	  time	  limit	  on	  a	  patient’s	  specific	  self-­‐image.	  Diagnosis	  takes	  a	  man	  or	  woman’s	  humanity,	  and	  uses	  it	  as	  a	  vessel	  to	  embody	  the	  living-­‐yet-­‐dying,	  frail	  and	  symptomatic	  essence	  of	  HIV/AIDS.	  Although	  actively	  spoken	  into	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existence	  by	  a	  medical	  professional,	  it	  shifts	  from	  a	  simple	  phrase	  to	  a	  being	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  this	  transformation	  is	  highlighted	  in	  narrative	  representations	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  in	  1980s	  America.	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Chapter	  2	  
The	  Absence	  of	  Diagnosis	  _____________________________________________________________________	  
	   When	  disease	  enters	  a	  previously	  healthy	  body	  and	  life,	  the	  newly	  afflicted	  hold	  certain	  expectations	  for	  how	  their	  illness	  should	  advance.	  These	  expectations	  involve	  a	  series	  of	  transitions,	  shifts	  from	  one	  perspective	  of	  an	  individual’s	  health	  and	  condition	  to	  another.	  One	  method	  of	  understanding	  personal	  shifts	  in	  health	  perspective	  begins	  with	  Annemarie	  Goldstein	  Jutel’s	  
Putting	  a	  Name	  to	  It:	  Diagnosis	  in	  Contemporary	  Society,	  which	  speaks	  of	  the	  differences	  intrinsic	  in	  the	  terms	  “illness”	  and	  “disease”	  (63).	  Jutel,	  using	  the	  frameworks	  first	  raised	  by	  Michael	  Balint	  in	  the	  1960s,	  posits	  that	  illness	  is	  the	  “personal	  experience	  of	  sickness”	  and	  results	  from	  individual	  identification	  of	  undesirable	  symptoms	  in	  one’s	  physical	  and	  social	  state	  (63).	  Upon	  recognition	  of	  these	  issues,	  illness	  displaces	  health	  as	  the	  self-­‐identifier	  of	  a	  person’s	  current	  state	  of	  being.	  A	  state	  of	  illness	  is	  thus	  spurred	  by	  the	  unforeseen	  appearance	  of	  symptoms,	  but	  defined	  and	  expressed	  by	  the	  individual.	  	  This	  “illness”	  state	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  precede	  the	  “disease”	  state.	  Jutel	  defines	  the	  disease	  state	  as	  “framed	  by	  the	  biological	  rather	  than	  the	  personal,”	  and	  because	  illness	  is	  instead	  framed	  by	  personal	  experience,	  the	  ill	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  impose	  this	  frame	  upon	  themselves	  (64).	  The	  labeling	  of	  “disease,”	  however,	  must	  be	  left	  to	  biological	  experts	  such	  as	  clinicians.	  Jutel’s	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definition	  helps	  unmask	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  illness	  to	  disease	  leads	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  agency	  from	  the	  afflicted	  to	  the	  medical	  expert,	  as	  focus	  moves	  from	  a	  patient’s	  personal	  experience	  to	  concrete	  biological	  clues	  as	  defined	  by	  physicians.	  This	  transferred	  agency	  refers	  specifically	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  define	  one’s	  current	  mental	  and	  physiological	  position	  while	  ill.	  As	  writer	  Julia	  Neuberger	  notes	  about	  her	  time	  at	  Harvard	  Medical	  School,	  tension	  and	  contradiction	  exist	  between	  the	  terms	  “active”	  and	  “patient”	  (Neuberger	  1999).	  Patients	  are	  socially	  viewed	  as	  physically	  sedentary	  and	  reactionary	  to	  both	  disease	  and	  physicians’	  orders,	  contrary	  to	  free	  choice	  inherent	  in	  the	  state	  of	  health.	  When	  the	  title	  of	  “patient”	  is	  accepted	  once	  a	  disease	  is	  formally	  noted,	  the	  agency	  of	  defining	  one’s	  own	  mental	  and	  physiological	  situation	  is	  handed	  over	  to	  a	  doctor.	  While	  this	  change	  is	  not	  instantaneous,	  the	  moment	  of	  diagnosis	  (the	  description	  of	  a	  set	  of	  recognized	  symptoms	  using	  the	  language	  and	  foundations	  of	  biology)	  signals	  a	  major	  shift.	  While	  a	  deviation	  from	  normal	  health	  naturally	  restricts	  one’s	  physical	  agency,	  one’s	  authority	  in	  naming	  their	  medical	  and	  social	  position	  remains	  until	  complicated	  by	  diagnosis.	  Author	  Joshua	  Ferris’	  The	  Unnamed	  uses	  a	  complete	  lack	  of	  diagnosis	  to	  elucidate	  how	  the	  relations	  between	  illness	  and	  disease	  shape	  the	  patient	  experience.	  As	  Ferris’	  main	  character	  Tim	  Farnsworth	  searches	  in	  vain	  to	  name	  his	  mysterious	  walking	  disorder,	  he	  tells	  his	  doctor	  that	  he	  would	  “prefer	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  a	  fatal	  disease”	  over	  no	  diagnosis	  at	  all,	  because	  he’d	  rather	  “have	  something	  I	  understand.”	  His	  doctor	  then	  replies	  poignantly,	  “do	  you	  think	  you’d	  understand	  Lou	  Gehrig’s?”	  (Ferris	  108).	  This	  scene	  addresses	  an	  important	  idea,	  
	   35	  
that	  extension	  of	  the	  pre-­‐diagnosis	  “illness”	  state	  seems,	  to	  Tim,	  a	  fate	  worse	  than	  death.	  The	  indescribable	  nature	  of	  his	  sudden,	  uncontrollable	  walking	  is	  both	  socially	  embarrassing	  and	  mentally	  exhausting,	  and	  without	  some	  level	  of	  understanding	  of	  his	  situation	  Tim	  states	  he	  would	  rather	  be	  dead.	  	  Stepping	  back	  from	  this	  scene	  momentarily,	  the	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  state	  is	  logically	  expected	  to	  be	  temporary,	  ending	  with	  medical	  understanding	  and	  description	  of	  disorder.	  Tim	  naturally	  expected	  his	  state	  of	  illness	  to	  be	  temporary,	  and	  his	  grim	  reaction	  to	  the	  extended	  existence	  of	  his	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  state	  implies	  that	  something	  about	  this	  position	  is	  deeply	  unnerving	  or	  upsetting.	  Jutel	  provides	  a	  useful	  angle	  to	  explain	  the	  source	  of	  such	  despair,	  asserting	  that	  diagnosis	  is	  the	  “fulcrum	  of	  the	  medical	  narrative”	  (65).	  Tim,	  and	  many	  who	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  ill,	  seek	  and	  expect	  to	  enter	  the	  medical	  narrative	  of	  diagnosis,	  treatment,	  and	  finally,	  restoration	  of	  health.	  Yet	  the	  diagnostic	  moment	  is	  more	  than	  just	  an	  important	  step	  of	  this	  journey—it	  is	  the	  “fulcrum,”	  the	  most	  essential	  aspect	  of	  a	  person’s	  medical	  narrative.	  The	  expected	  medical	  narrative	  can	  exist	  without	  identifying	  an	  ideal	  treatment,	  or	  leading	  to	  perfect	  health,	  but	  it	  is	  closed	  off	  without	  initial	  diagnosis.	  Even	  a	  terminal	  diagnosis	  allows	  for	  the	  medical	  narrative	  to	  continue,	  albeit	  not	  ending	  in	  a	  final	  return	  to	  health,	  but	  still	  perhaps	  leading	  to	  some	  palliative	  treatment	  to	  ease	  discomfort.	  Tim’s	  preference	  of	  a	  fatal	  diagnosis	  over	  none	  at	  all	  begs	  the	  question:	  why	  is	  entrance	  into	  a	  medical	  narrative	  so	  desperately	  sought	  after?	  As	  his	  doctor	  astutely	  points	  out,	  this	  desire	  goes	  beyond	  seeking	  to	  “understand”	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Tim’s	  biological	  problems,	  as	  the	  naming	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  can	  be	  merely	  that,	  a	  scientific	  name	  for	  a	  set	  of	  issues	  not	  fully	  understood,	  such	  as	  attention	  deficit	  hyperactivity	  disorder	  (ADHD).	  Although	  an	  illusion	  exists	  that	  medicine	  holds	  all	  the	  answers,	  even	  the	  best-­‐researched	  disorders	  deny	  some	  level	  of	  comprehension;	  their	  microbial	  beginnings	  can	  only	  be	  guessed	  at,	  and	  medicine	  can	  never	  tell	  the	  complete	  story	  of	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  infinitely	  complex	  human	  body.	  Yet	  diagnosis	  can	  provide	  some	  level	  of	  knowledge	  or	  structure	  to	  the	  unwell.	  Through	  this	  frame,	  an	  image	  emerges	  of	  the	  undiagnosed	  sick	  as	  hovering	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  limbo,	  unable	  to	  return	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  health	  as	  their	  symptoms	  persist,	  yet	  denied	  entry	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  medicine	  that	  is	  initially	  expected,	  even	  assumed,	  by	  all	  those	  who	  seek	  medical	  assistance.	  Alan	  Lightman’s	  novel	  The	  Diagnosis	  begins	  with	  a	  sudden	  onset	  of	  symptoms	  for	  the	  main	  character,	  Bill	  Chalmers.	  While	  riding	  the	  metro	  to	  work,	  Bill	  is	  struck	  by	  an	  unexpected	  bout	  of	  numbness	  and	  amnesia,	  as	  he	  forgets	  his	  stop	  and	  even	  his	  own	  name.	  Near	  the	  end	  of	  this	  episode,	  Bill	  “held	  up	  his	  hands	  and	  examined	  the	  veins	  near	  the	  surface,	  fragile	  and	  faint	  like	  the	  strings	  of	  a	  puppet”	  (Lightman	  19,	  emphasis	  added).	  Bill	  looks	  at	  his	  own	  hand	  and	  sees	  something	  foreign,	  something	  separate	  from	  himself.	  One	  reading	  of	  this	  moment	  may	  suggest	  that	  in	  his	  amnesia,	  Bill	  has	  simply	  forgotten	  what	  a	  hand	  is	  and	  what	  its	  connection	  is	  to	  him.	  But	  Lightman	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  moment,	  the	  onset	  of	  Bill’s	  fruitless	  journey	  to	  find	  diagnosis,	  and	  carefully	  shapes	  the	  scene	  to	  speak	  to	  conflicting	  aspects	  of	  Bill’s	  experience	  of	  disease	  without	  a	  name.	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   In	  this	  scene,	  Bill	  has	  just	  entered	  the	  realm	  of	  illness—he	  recognizes	  that	  something	  inside	  his	  mind	  has	  gone	  amok,	  that	  he	  has	  deviated	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  normal	  health.	  Lightman’s	  choice	  to	  medicalize	  Bill’s	  view	  of	  himself	  in	  this	  instance	  speaks	  to	  the	  complicated	  agency	  that	  Bill	  holds.	  The	  choice	  of	  “examined”	  to	  describe	  Bill’s	  purveying	  of	  his	  hand	  is	  purposefully	  scientific	  and	  technical.	  Although	  he	  had	  only	  begun	  to	  exhibit	  illness	  that	  morning,	  Bill	  has	  already	  medicalized	  his	  perspective	  of	  himself,	  viewing	  his	  hand	  as	  a	  doctor	  examines	  a	  patient’s	  symptoms.	  The	  odd	  comparison	  of	  his	  veins	  to	  puppet	  strings	  is	  what	  initially	  catches	  the	  reader’s	  eye,	  emphasizing	  the	  estrangement	  Bill	  feels	  toward	  his	  own	  body,	  as	  something	  separate	  and	  under	  external	  control.	  Yet	  the	  strangeness	  of	  this	  scene	  actually	  begins	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  Bill’s	  perception	  of	  his	  body	  as	  something	  to	  be	  inspected.	  Possessing	  the	  agency	  to	  label	  himself	  ill	  leads	  to	  Bill’s	  self-­‐medicalization,	  as	  if	  his	  symptoms	  are	  a	  problem	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  logical	  and	  scientific	  manner	  by	  someone,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  Bill	  hopes	  to	  assume	  this	  investigative	  role	  himself.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  seeks	  to	  understand	  or	  name	  these	  symptoms,	  beginning	  the	  search	  for	  diagnosis	  without	  external	  help.	  Even	  though	  Bill	  is	  the	  only	  character	  in	  this	  scene,	  he	  still	  creates	  a	  sort	  of	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship,	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor	  as	  well	  as	  the	  source	  of	  symptoms.	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  theory	  of	  the	  clinical	  gaze,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  sick	  are	  viewed	  as	  a	  template	  or	  example	  of	  disease,	  illuminates	  this	  picture—Bill	  fashions	  himself	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  gaze,	  with	  his	  hands	  as	  the	  object	  of	  the	  gaze	  itself.	  This	  “fashioning”	  on	  Bill’s	  part	  highlights	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  level	  of	  authority,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  this	  sense	  of	  agency	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is	  complicated	  by	  his	  realization	  that	  his	  hands	  are	  suddenly	  separate,	  controlled	  as	  if	  by	  a	  puppet	  master.	  	   There	  is	  a	  noticeable	  absence	  of	  the	  words	  “amnesia”	  or	  “numbness”	  from	  this	  entire	  scene.	  These	  pseudo-­‐diagnoses	  are	  hinted	  at,	  but	  never	  stated,	  which	  complicates	  the	  image	  of	  Bill	  acting	  as	  a	  doctor	  to	  examine	  himself.	  Bill’s	  attempt	  to	  construct	  himself	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  clinical	  gaze,	  and	  his	  hands	  as	  the	  object,	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  he	  had	  hoped.	  The	  struggle	  for	  Bill	  to	  act	  as	  the	  classic	  subject	  of	  the	  clinical	  gaze	  represents	  more	  than	  just	  a	  lack	  of	  his	  own	  clinical	  experience,	  as	  even	  a	  lay	  reader	  may	  associate	  the	  term	  “numbness”	  with	  such	  a	  scenario.	  Perhaps	  even	  with	  his	  strange,	  newfound	  amnesia	  and	  physical	  desensitization,	  Bill	  can’t	  separate	  himself	  from	  his	  body	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  name	  what	  is	  clearly	  amiss	  inside	  him.	  This	  suggests	  Bill’s	  inability	  to	  exhibit	  the	  third	  party	  objectivity	  needed	  to	  use	  clinical	  terms	  like	  these.	  	  Diagnosis	  is	  useful	  in	  part	  because	  it	  names	  a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  a	  person	  that	  is	  malfunctioning,	  transforming	  aspects	  of	  the	  body	  into	  “broken”	  or	  “faulty”	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  beholder,	  whether	  that	  is	  patient,	  doctor,	  or	  uninvolved	  observer.	  By	  distinguishing	  the	  aspects	  of	  an	  individual	  that	  are	  dysfunctional,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  body	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  separate	  from	  these	  problematic	  areas,	  and	  can	  only	  then	  be	  safely	  assumed	  “healthy.”	  As	  Foucault	  points	  out,	  the	  clinical	  gaze	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  disease	  inhabits	  specific	  spaces	  in	  the	  body.	  The	  sick	  spaces	  must	  be	  identified	  before	  the	  healthy	  ones	  can	  be	  defined,	  yet	  as	  previously	  shown,	  Bill	  is	  unable	  to	  utilize	  the	  clinical	  gaze	  upon	  himself.	  This	  results	  in	  his	  failure	  to	  even	  mention	  the	  medical	  terms	  amnesia	  or	  numbness;	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he	  is	  unable	  to	  label	  his	  symptoms	  and	  cannot	  discover	  and	  demarcate	  the	  sick	  from	  the	  normal	  in	  his	  own	  body.	  	  Bill’s	  amnesia	  contributes	  to	  his	  conflicting	  perspective,	  as	  it	  suggests	  Bill’s	  mind	  itself	  may	  be	  the	  issue.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  suggests	  the	  impossibility	  of	  applying	  a	  medical	  gaze	  to	  one’s	  self.	  Although	  that	  is	  the	  first	  thing	  Bill	  attempts	  to	  do,	  to	  rationally	  analyze	  his	  symptoms,	  Bill’s	  gaze	  is	  rooted	  in	  his	  mind.	  How	  can	  Bill	  trust	  his	  own	  judgment	  while	  he	  exhibits	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  mind	  like	  amnesia?	  Bill	  is	  forced	  to	  recognize	  that	  even	  his	  mental	  faculties	  can’t	  be	  trusted	  if	  he	  can’t	  identify	  the	  location	  of	  the	  disease	  inside	  himself.	  	  	   The	  interesting	  description	  of	  veins	  throughout	  his	  hands,	  “fragile	  and	  faint	  like	  the	  strings	  of	  a	  puppet,”	  is	  suggestive	  of	  Bill’s	  shifting	  self-­‐image	  as	  well.	  This	  striking	  dehumanization	  of	  not	  only	  his	  hands,	  but	  also	  his	  own	  blood,	  stems	  from	  the	  suddenness	  and	  inexplicability	  of	  his	  symptoms.	  The	  separation	  seen	  between	  Bill	  and	  these	  parts	  of	  his	  body	  suggests	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  some	  other	  force	  may	  be	  at	  play.	  Not	  only	  are	  his	  hands	  and	  veins	  separate	  from	  his	  body,	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  suddenly	  subjected	  to	  some	  external	  control,	  shown	  in	  their	  comparison	  to	  the	  strings	  of	  a	  puppet.	  This	  scene	  connects	  directly	  to	  Joshua	  Ferris’	  The	  Unnamed,	  a	  novel	  about	  a	  man	  whose	  legs	  develop	  a	  mind	  of	  their	  own	  and	  walk	  for	  hours	  at	  a	  time.	  In	  this	  story,	  Tim	  feels	  that	  his	  body	  has	  been	  “hijacked”	  by	  “that	  thing,”	  referring	  to	  his	  unnamed	  disease.	  While	  Bill’s	  veins-­‐as-­‐puppet-­‐strings	  scene	  illuminates	  the	  loss	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  his	  illness	  narrative,	  Tim’s	  scene	  occurs	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story,	  after	  years	  of	  searching	  in	  vain	  for	  diagnosis.	  The	  similarity	  between	  Bill’s	  and	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Tim’s	  use	  of	  language	  is	  striking,	  especially	  given	  that	  one	  would	  assume	  Tim	  is	  very	  experienced	  living	  in	  this	  illness	  space.	  Tim	  refers	  to	  his	  disease	  as	  the	  unyielding	  commander	  over	  his	  body,	  and	  this	  tyrannical	  presentation	  of	  his	  disorder	  may	  result	  from	  years	  of	  futile	  resistance	  to	  walking.	  If	  Bill’s	  veins	  are	  “like	  the	  strings	  of	  a	  puppet”	  then	  perhaps	  Bill	  is	  similarly	  referencing	  his	  unnamed	  disorder	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  puppet	  master,	  albeit	  in	  a	  gentler	  and	  subtler	  way,	  without	  years	  of	  frustration	  fueling	  his	  diction.	  	  Agency	  is	  thus	  naturally	  removed	  from	  the	  sick	  in	  two	  ways.	  Symptoms	  naturally	  restrain	  someone	  from	  acting	  at	  a	  normal	  level—if	  deviations	  from	  normal	  health	  increase	  one’s	  abilities,	  they	  are	  instead	  termed	  superpowers	  (which	  are	  much	  rarer	  than	  symptoms	  in	  the	  medical	  narrative	  realm).	  In	  addition	  to	  symptoms	  being	  physically	  or	  mentally	  handicapping,	  agency	  dissipates	  from	  individuals	  with	  undiagnosed	  disease	  because	  the	  un-­‐nameable	  nature	  of	  their	  disorder	  gives	  the	  disorder	  itself	  an	  untamable	  identity,	  powerful	  enough	  to	  “hijack”	  one’s	  own	  body.	  The	  term	  “hijacked”	  echoes	  the	  medicalized	  sense	  of	  “examined,”	  as	  both	  terms	  suggest	  a	  shift	  toward	  viewing	  one’s	  body	  as	  a	  nonhuman	  entity.	  Planes	  and	  cars	  are	  hijacked,	  not	  bodies.	  Similarly,	  distinct	  symptoms	  are	  examined	  in	  medicine	  as	  biological	  cues,	  not	  as	  subjective	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  experience.	  The	  locus	  of	  examination	  provides	  an	  interesting	  tension	  here,	  as	  a	  vehicle	  is	  hijacked	  from	  the	  inside,	  whereas	  the	  body	  is	  examined	  at	  a	  distance.	  As	  disease	  gains	  control,	  a	  strange	  new	  perspective	  emerges,	  in	  which	  one’s	  body	  is	  something	  to	  be	  manipulated,	  from	  within	  and	  without.	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This	  concept	  brings	  to	  mind	  Kristeva’s	  theory	  of	  the	  abject,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one.	  The	  abject	  refers	  to	  a	  failed	  delineation	  between	  self	  and	  non-­‐self	  emanations	  from	  the	  body,	  such	  as	  sweat	  or	  bleeding.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  abject	  associated	  with	  one’s	  body	  is	  met	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  horror,	  as	  one	  grapples	  with	  the	  futility	  of	  identifying	  differences	  between	  themselves	  and	  their	  excretions.	  For	  example,	  sweat	  and	  saliva	  are	  intrinsic,	  necessary	  aspects	  of	  our	  bodies,	  yet	  upon	  expulsion	  they	  disgust	  us.	  We	  loathe	  seeing	  ourselves	  in	  them,	  because	  we	  are,	  in	  the	  end,	  unable	  to	  separate	  ourselves	  from	  the	  abject.	  Tim	  and	  Bill	  face	  the	  abject	  as	  they	  experience	  the	  futility	  of	  attempting	  to	  view	  specific	  diseased	  aspects	  of	  their	  bodies	  (or	  even	  their	  bodies	  as	  a	  whole)	  as	  entities	  separate	  from	  their	  perceived	  identity.	  This	  exposes	  an	  interesting	  dynamic	  in	  the	  way	  we	  perceive	  borders	  between	  disease	  and	  ourselves.	  Physical	  manifestations	  of	  named	  disorders,	  such	  as	  lesions	  from	  Karposi’s	  sarcoma,	  may	  originate	  from	  the	  body	  but	  they	  are	  designed	  and	  sculpted	  by	  AIDS—the	  body	  simply	  serves	  as	  resource	  for	  flesh.	  This	  exemplifies	  the	  major	  connection	  between	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  abject,	  that	  diagnosis	  promises	  to	  salvage	  the	  subject,	  in	  this	  case	  Tim	  or	  Bill,	  by	  framing	  and	  enclosing	  the	  abject.	  In	  a	  way,	  diagnosis	  hopes	  to	  remedy	  the	  fear	  that	  ensues	  from	  dwelling	  upon	  the	  ambiguous	  and	  elusive	  nature	  of	  the	  abject.	  	  Without	  diagnosis,	  ill	  individuals	  are	  left	  to	  do	  the	  boundary-­‐constructing	  work	  promised	  by	  diagnosis	  on	  their	  own.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  one’s	  symptomatic	  areas	  in	  both	  The	  Unnamed	  and	  The	  
Diagnosis,	  which	  exemplifies	  an	  attempt	  to	  delineate	  sick	  from	  healthy	  without	  the	  tool	  of	  diagnosis.	  As	  Tim	  first	  loses	  control	  of	  his	  legs,	  the	  narrative	  begins	  to	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hint	  that	  some	  “other”	  being	  is	  developing	  inside	  him.	  At	  first,	  Tim’s	  body	  seems	  to	  develop	  its	  own	  identity,	  speaking	  “a	  persuasive	  language	  of	  its	  own”	  (Ferris	  109).	  Not	  only	  is	  his	  own	  body	  fighting	  to	  occupy	  its	  own	  persona,	  it	  is	  denying	  Tim	  any	  level	  of	  communication	  or	  understanding,	  seen	  in	  Ferris’	  choice	  of	  “language	  of	  its	  own”	  to	  describe	  Tim’s	  bodily	  rejection.	  After	  years	  of	  searching	  intensively	  for	  a	  diagnosis,	  Tim’s	  view	  of	  his	  body	  undergoes	  an	  intriguing	  shift.	  As	  his	  body	  turned	  on	  him	  years	  ago,	  Tim	  finally	  turns	  against	  his	  body.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  distinction—while	  his	  legs	  betrayed	  him	  by	  walking	  against	  his	  wishes,	  Tim	  moves	  beyond	  blaming	  his	  legs,	  and	  sets	  himself	  against	  his	  entire	  body.	  Unable	  to	  understand	  why	  his	  legs	  rejected	  his	  control,	  Tim	  sorts	  his	  whole	  physical	  being	  into	  a	  foreign	  entity,	  one	  that	  has	  maliciously	  denied	  him	  any	  level	  of	  communication	  or	  understanding.	  	  	   The	  lens	  of	  the	  abject	  provides	  some	  clarity	  to	  Tim’s	  rejection	  of	  his	  physical	  figure.	  Fear	  of	  the	  abject	  is	  based	  in	  the	  struggle	  to	  delineate	  death	  from	  life,	  and	  similarly	  Tim	  recognizes	  some	  non-­‐human	  “other”	  inside	  himself.	  As	  diagnosis	  is	  unable	  to	  identify	  this	  unnamed	  presence,	  and	  cannot	  frame	  Tim	  as	  subject,	  and	  the	  disjointed	  and	  diseased	  within	  him	  as	  the	  object,	  he	  chooses	  to	  reject	  his	  whole	  body	  instead	  of	  living	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  contamination	  within	  his	  own	  identity.	  Throughout	  the	  story,	  Tim	  references	  suicide	  as	  a	  serious	  option.	  This	  discussion	  of	  his	  rejection	  of	  his	  body	  and	  disorder	  together	  illuminates	  that	  although	  Tim	  says	  “suicide,”	  he	  views	  this	  act	  as	  more	  of	  martyrdom	  (Ferris	  222).	  His	  separation	  into	  mind	  versus	  contaminated	  body	  allows	  for	  this	  distinction—where	  a	  malevolent	  presence	  exists,	  the	  sacrifice	  of	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one’s	  life	  to	  destroy	  it	  is	  a	  completely	  different	  mindset	  than	  committing	  suicide	  just	  to	  end	  one’s	  suffering.	  Discussions	  of	  bodily	  disconnect	  accompanying	  a	  mystery	  diagnosis	  appear	  in	  non-­‐fiction	  narratives	  as	  well.	  Meghan	  O’Rourke’s	  biographical	  New	  
Yorker	  essay	  “What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Me?”	  describes	  her	  struggle	  to	  find	  a	  name	  for	  the	  mysterious	  autoimmune	  disorder	  taking	  over	  her	  life.	  This	  online	  diagnostic	  narrative	  is	  slightly	  different	  than	  The	  Unnamed	  and	  The	  Diagnosis,	  in	  that	  O’Rourke	  is	  given	  multiple	  diagnoses,	  which	  are	  each	  proven	  false	  by	  their	  ineffectual	  resulting	  treatments.	  Yet	  through	  this	  journey	  of	  false	  hope	  and	  disappointment,	  O’Rourke	  takes	  a	  full	  three	  paragraphs	  of	  her	  essay	  to	  explain	  her	  disconnect.	  Physically,	  her	  eyes	  and	  face	  felt	  like	  “distinct	  parts	  of	  the	  body,	  as	  perceptible	  as	  fingers,”	  reminiscent	  of	  Bill’s	  and	  Tim’s	  experience	  (O’Rourke).	  Interestingly,	  O’Rourke	  senses	  a	  physical	  separation	  that	  transcends	  what	  she	  can	  see—her	  vision,	  usually	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  limits	  and	  identities	  of	  non-­‐self	  entities,	  seems	  itself	  contaminated	  or	  “fraudulent.”	  This	  language	  echoes	  Bill’s	  inability	  to	  trust	  his	  own	  judgment,	  to	  impose	  a	  medical	  gaze	  upon	  himself.	  Like	  Bill,	  O’Rourke	  felt	  that	  “everything	  [inside	  her]	  was	  wrong”	  and	  she	  “wasn’t	  sure	  anymore”	  what	  constituted	  her	  own	  healthy	  identity,	  nor	  what	  had	  been	  taken	  by	  this	  mysterious	  disorder.	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  frame	  portrays	  the	  body	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  battlefield,	  in	  which	  the	  enemy’s	  identity,	  strength,	  and	  location	  are	  unknowable	  before	  diagnosis.	  How	  can	  anyone	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  not	  feel	  like	  their	  very	  identity	  is	  eroding	  away,	  and	  not	  feel	  “fraudulent”	  without	  grasping	  what	  is	  truly	  them	  and	  what’s	  been	  distorted	  by	  disease?	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O’Rourke’s	  experience	  of	  disorientation	  extends	  beyond	  just	  the	  physical,	  to	  the	  “loss	  of	  an	  intact	  sense	  of	  self.”	  This	  cryptic	  statement	  is	  elucidated	  somewhat	  by	  a	  line	  found	  in	  the	  quotation	  below,	  where	  she	  eloquently	  mentions	  that	  the	  healthy	  “have	  the	  luxury	  of	  forgetting	  that	  our	  existence	  depends	  on	  a	  cascade	  of	  precise	  cellular	  interactions.”	  She	  follows	  this	  statement	  with	  her	  shortest	  sentence,	  “Not	  you.”	  (O’Rourke)	  The	  weight	  of	  this	  line	  is	  palpable,	  referring	  to	  the	  chronically	  ill	  yet	  undiagnosed	  experience.	  Her	  ordeal	  seeking	  diagnosis,	  like	  those	  of	  Tim	  and	  Bill,	  is	  characterized	  by	  dozens	  of	  tests	  that	  seek	  to	  return	  her	  to	  health;	  yet	  these	  tests	  overshadow	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  illness,	  such	  as	  patient	  history	  and	  opinion,	  with	  intense	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  body’s	  biological	  workings.	  The	  constant	  lab	  tests	  that	  accompany	  diagnostic	  searching	  actually	  remove	  a	  patient’s	  humanity	  from	  the	  equation	  in	  their	  search	  for	  answers,	  replacing	  a	  patient’s	  subjective	  experience	  with	  an	  objective	  frame	  of	  their	  calculable	  symptoms.	  This	  conflict	  may	  contribute	  directly	  to	  O’Rourke’s	  mentioned	  “loss	  of	  self.”	  Tim	  temporarily	  rejects	  the	  diagnostic	  search,	  frustrated	  that	  it	  reduces	  him	  to	  a	  “gerbil”	  on	  a	  wheel	  (Ferris	  8).	  The	  exhaustive	  search	  to	  label	  disease	  can	  raise	  the	  disease’s	  priority	  above	  that	  of	  the	  patient,	  as	  the	  patient	  becomes	  a	  source	  of	  symptoms,	  a	  “cascade	  of	  precise	  cellular	  interactions”	  and	  clues	  to	  reach	  the	  pot	  of	  gold:	  not	  health,	  which	  remains	  a	  distant	  goal,	  but	  first	  and	  foremost	  diagnosis.	  	  A	  tension	  is	  beginning	  to	  appear,	  considering	  the	  various	  proponents	  and	  detractors	  to	  a	  patient’s	  agency	  in	  the	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  stage.	  Three	  agency-­‐affecting	  factors	  have	  now	  been	  discussed—the	  natural	  reduction	  in	  a	  patient’s	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ability	  to	  perform	  physical	  or	  mental	  actions	  as	  disorders	  progress,	  the	  agency	  inhibited	  when	  patients	  choose	  to	  frame	  themselves	  within	  the	  illness	  stage,	  and	  the	  projection	  of	  some	  external	  controller	  of	  a	  patient’s	  physical	  body.	  Thus,	  the	  push	  and	  pull	  upon	  patients’	  abilities	  to	  control	  how	  they	  and	  their	  disorder	  are	  framed	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  it	  may	  have	  originally	  seemed.	  This	  complexity	  manifests	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literary	  representation	  of	  living	  with	  a	  disorder	  but	  without	  a	  diagnosis,	  shown	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  specific	  cast	  of	  words	  that	  appear	  throughout	  topical	  fiction	  and	  nonfiction	  alike.	  	  O’Rourke,	  in	  discussing	  the	  complexity	  of	  autoimmune	  disorders,	  mentions	  “all	  this	  uncertainty	  adds	  to	  the	  shadowiness	  of	  the	  experience”	  (O’Rourke,	  emphasis	  added).	  The	  intricacies	  of	  the	  immune	  system	  merely	  contribute	  to	  the	  “shadowiness”	  of	  her	  experience—her	  experience	  of	  living	  in	  a	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  illness	  state	  is	  beyond	  frustrating,	  beyond	  confusing.	  The	  testing	  phase	  is	  full	  of	  extensive	  medical	  imaging,	  through	  MRIs,	  CAT	  scans,	  etc.	  and	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  a	  body.	  But	  this	  wealth	  of	  discovered	  knowledge,	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  label	  for	  one’s	  disorder,	  actually	  envelops	  a	  patient	  in	  darkness	  and	  confusion.	  Every	  test	  passed	  represents	  a	  healthy	  aspect	  of	  a	  patient’s	  body.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  comfort	  found	  in	  such	  an	  affirmation	  of	  health,	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  mystery	  disorder	  still	  lurks	  and	  the	  patient	  remains	  in	  a	  perpetual	  state	  of	  disorientation,	  searching	  for	  a	  location	  and	  description	  of	  what	  is	  biologically	  wrong.	  Tim	  refers	  to	  his	  uncontrollable	  walking	  as	  a	  “specter,”	  and	  Bill,	  throughout	  his	  degeneration,	  hears	  a	  mysterious,	  low	  buzz,	  which	  through	  this	  lens	  is	  seen	  to	  represent	  the	  disorientation	  and	  discombobulation	  of	  ambiguous	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illness.	  The	  term	  “specter”	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  represents	  the	  human	  reaction	  to	  the	  unknown.	  This	  anonymous	  disorder	  is	  impossible	  to	  accurately	  represent,	  yet	  in	  seeking	  to	  do	  exactly	  that	  it	  is	  portrayed	  as	  a	  hulking,	  cunning,	  and	  inherently	  evil	  “specter.”	  Its	  identity	  is	  cemented	  as	  threatening	  and	  difficult,	  perhaps	  impossible,	  to	  overcome.	  Even	  a	  named	  yet	  deadly	  disorder	  like	  cancer	  can	  be	  visualized	  through	  its	  name,	  and	  what	  is	  visualizable	  may	  perhaps	  be	  defeated.	  But	  a	  shadowy	  specter	  seems	  far	  more	  threatening,	  as	  its	  likely	  future	  course	  cannot	  be	  acknowledged,	  planned	  around,	  or	  accepted.	  	   The	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  experiences	  in	  The	  Unnamed,	  The	  Diagnosis,	  and	  “What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Me?”	  are	  riddled	  with	  numerous	  tests	  and	  scans,	  searching	  for	  something	  amiss	  in	  the	  body.	  In	  addition	  to	  reducing	  a	  patient	  to	  a	  set	  of	  numbers	  and	  images	  to	  be	  compared	  against	  healthy	  baselines,	  when	  these	  tests	  find	  nothing	  wrong,	  an	  interesting	  type	  of	  diagnostic	  experience	  occurs.	  Jutel	  discusses	  the	  “diagnosis	  of	  exclusion,”	  which	  is	  offered	  when	  “a	  panoply	  of	  other	  potential	  medical	  explanations	  fail	  to	  explain”	  various	  symptoms	  (77).	  This	  is	  a	  curious	  term,	  as	  the	  word	  “diagnosis”	  is	  assumed	  to	  emerge	  from	  a	  proven	  understanding	  of	  one	  underlying	  cause	  for	  a	  set	  of	  related	  symptoms.	  Yet	  “diagnosis”	  is	  far	  more	  flexible	  than	  this	  simple	  definition	  suggests,	  and	  the	  identification	  and	  understanding	  of	  disease	  implicit	  in	  the	  term	  “diagnosis”	  isn’t	  always	  as	  scientific	  as	  it	  seems.	  Meghan	  O’Rourke’s	  autoimmune	  diagnosis	  is	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion,	  and	  it	  exposes	  the	  issues	  implicit	  in	  pseudo-­‐diagnosis.	  An	  array	  of	  tests	  failed	  to	  demonstrate	  anything	  wrong	  in	  her	  body,	  until	  O’Rourke	  heard	  that	  one	  doctor	  strongly	  suspected	  she	  had	  an	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autoimmune	  disorder.	  Although	  this	  physician	  may	  not	  have	  realized	  she	  was	  settling	  for	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion,	  the	  compulsive	  search	  for	  diagnosis	  implicit	  in	  the	  patient-­‐doctor	  relationship	  makes	  accepting	  the	  first	  possible	  diagnosis	  very	  tempting,	  even	  if	  that	  frame	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  imprecise.	  	   Autoimmunity	  exemplifies	  a	  few	  classic	  characteristics	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion.	  This	  sort	  of	  diagnosis	  tends	  to	  be	  secondhand	  and	  broad—autoimmunity	  is	  itself	  generally	  a	  result	  of	  some	  other	  genetic	  or	  viral	  malfunction,	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  distinct	  symptoms	  can	  result	  from	  an	  immune	  system	  turning	  on	  its	  own	  host.	  So	  often	  this	  sort	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  a	  crutch,	  utilized	  to	  provide	  some	  sort	  of	  answer	  for	  both	  the	  patient	  and	  the	  doctor.	  It	  signifies	  an	  exaggerated	  level	  of	  progress	  toward	  truth	  and	  temporarily	  halts	  the	  journey	  toward	  a	  proven	  and	  useful	  diagnosis.	  O’Rourke,	  as	  many	  patients	  do,	  reacted	  to	  this	  diagnosis	  with	  relief,	  and	  accepted	  it	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  her	  medical	  issues.	  Her	  blind	  acceptance	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  was	  seen	  as	  she	  became	  “hyperconscious	  of	  what	  [she]	  ate	  and	  what	  [she]	  exposed	  herself	  to,”	  cutting	  many	  healthy	  and	  normal	  foods	  out	  of	  her	  diet.	  It	  also	  shows	  the	  dangers	  of	  settling	  for	  a	  non-­‐specific	  diagnosis.	  The	  vast	  confidence	  in	  modern	  medicine	  implicit	  in	  a	  patient’s	  framing	  of	  his	  or	  her	  doctor	  can	  lead	  to	  expansive,	  yet	  ultimately	  fruitless	  or	  even	  harmful,	  changes	  in	  the	  patient’s	  life.	  O’Rourke’s	  massive	  dietary	  swing	  alleviated	  no	  symptoms,	  and	  actually	  led	  to	  inflammation	  of	  her	  digestive	  tract.	  Diagnosis	  should	  be	  a	  path	  to	  fixing	  one’s	  problems,	  yet	  in	  this	  case	  the	  pseudo-­‐diagnosis	  of	  autoimmunity	  took	  O’Rourke	  even	  further	  from	  health.	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   Jutel	  discusses	  another	  common	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  that	  appears	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  Bill	  and	  O’Rourke,	  which	  has	  striking	  effects	  upon	  a	  disease’s	  relation	  to	  the	  assumed	  power	  of	  modern	  medicine.	  Psychodiagnosis	  refers	  to	  a	  disease	  rooted	  in	  the	  mind,	  either	  causing	  physical	  symptoms	  or	  twisting	  a	  patient’s	  reality	  to	  make	  him	  or	  her	  believe	  certain	  symptoms	  exist.	  This	  type	  of	  diagnosis	  both	  presumes	  and	  protects	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  doctor	  and	  medicine	  at	  large	  (Jutel	  83).	  The	  infinite	  complexity	  and	  un-­‐testability	  of	  the	  human	  brain	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  excuse	  for	  a	  doctor’s	  inability	  to	  locate	  a	  diagnosis.	  The	  brain	  is	  much	  better	  understood	  than	  it	  was	  a	  century	  ago,	  but	  we	  are	  still	  far	  from	  cracking	  many	  of	  its	  secrets.	  So	  psychodiagnosis	  is	  presented	  as	  if	  the	  unstoppable	  force	  of	  modern	  medicine	  is	  meeting	  the	  indecipherable	  human	  brain,	  not	  as	  if	  a	  physician	  has	  failed	  to	  find	  an	  elusive	  diagnosis.	  	  Psychodiagnosis	  is	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion,	  seen	  as	  Dr.	  Petrov	  informs	  Bill	  that	  because	  a	  pile	  of	  other	  tests	  came	  back	  negative,	  Bill	  should	  go	  see	  a	  psychiatrist,	  Dr.	  Kripke.	  Bill	  is	  incredulous	  at	  this	  suggestion,	  and	  responds	  “do	  you	  think	  I’m	  imagining	  all	  of	  this?”	  Even	  if	  the	  disorder	  is	  rooted	  in	  his	  brain,	  Bill	  is	  still	  sick,	  not	  merely	  “imagining”	  his	  debilitating	  symptoms.	  Yet	  Dr.	  Petrov’s	  response	  offers	  no	  relief,	  only	  offering	  “I	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time.”	  (Lightman	  183)	  Dr.	  Petrov’s	  focus	  upon	  finding	  a	  diagnosis	  has	  removed	  concern	  and	  respect	  for	  Bill’s	  subjective	  experience,	  as	  he	  sees	  no	  reason	  to	  correct	  Bill’s	  worry	  that	  his	  issues	  are	  simply	  “imagined”;	  his	  emotionless,	  automated	  response	  instead	  reflects	  his	  real	  concern,	  the	  quantifiable	  and	  objective	  aspect	  of	  Bill’s	  symptoms.	  Moreover,	  Jutel	  points	  out	  
	   49	  
that	  this	  approach	  toward	  an	  unexplained	  set	  of	  symptoms	  shifts	  the	  burden	  of	  disease	  from	  a	  doctor	  back	  onto	  the	  patient.	  Physical	  symptoms	  are	  framed	  as	  out	  of	  a	  patient’s	  control,	  while	  psychiatric	  issues	  suggest	  that	  perhaps	  a	  patient	  can	  control,	  or	  even	  reverse,	  a	  mental	  syndrome	  by	  merely	  changing	  the	  way	  he	  or	  she	  thinks.	  Although	  the	  body	  is	  presented	  as	  under	  complete	  individual	  control,	  it	  is	  the	  mind	  that	  both	  makes	  up	  a	  patient’s	  identity	  and	  resists	  a	  tangible	  interpretation.	  Issues	  of	  the	  psyche	  thus	  seem	  deceptively	  simple	  for	  a	  person	  to	  change	  or	  fix,	  if	  that	  individual	  simply	  has	  the	  will	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  the	  disorder	  is	  “just	  in	  your	  head,”	  a	  patient	  naturally	  wonders	  if	  they	  are	  simply	  “crazy,”	  if	  the	  disease	  stems	  from	  some	  fault	  of	  their	  own	  (O’Rourke).	  	  	   For	  Bill,	  beyond	  the	  initial	  psychodiagnostic	  event,	  in	  which	  Dr.	  Petrov	  suggests	  Bill’s	  issues	  may	  lie	  in	  his	  mind,	  the	  only	  diagnosis	  he	  receives	  from	  Dr.	  Kripke	  is	  strikingly	  non-­‐medical.	  Dr.	  Kripke	  suggests	  that	  Bill	  is	  “putting	  his	  anger	  into	  numbness,”	  which	  holds	  interesting	  implications	  for	  Bill’s	  framing	  of	  his	  disorder	  (Lightman	  202).	  This	  diagnosis	  provides	  none	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  formal	  medical	  name,	  and	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  move	  Bill	  out	  of	  the	  illness	  stage	  and	  into	  the	  medical	  narrative	  of	  named	  diagnosis	  preceding	  treatment.	  Yet	  this	  is	  an	  answer	  Bill	  can	  understand—regardless	  of	  its	  lack	  of	  scientific	  validity,	  Bill	  begins	  to	  feel	  some	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  from	  this	  description	  of	  his	  disease.	  Maybe	  even	  a	  diagnosis	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  medical	  in	  nature	  gives	  a	  patient	  something	  to	  point	  at,	  some	  semblance	  of	  causation	  for	  the	  new	  symptomatic	  troubles	  in	  their	  lives.	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   While	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  is	  one	  reaction	  to	  the	  suspenseful	  nature	  of	  the	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  stage,	  another	  remarkable	  reaction	  occurs	  in	  all	  three	  narratives	  investigated	  in	  this	  chapter.	  While	  in	  Dr.	  Petrov’s	  waiting	  room,	  discussing	  a	  mutual	  frustration	  with	  their	  respective	  lack	  of	  diagnoses	  with	  another	  patient,	  Bill	  hears	  one	  unique	  phrase	  many	  times.	  The	  patient	  Bill	  is	  speaking	  to	  continues	  using	  the	  phrase	  “pro	  tem”	  in	  normal	  conversation,	  an	  otherwise	  rare	  and	  atypical	  phrase.	  This	  phrase	  echoes	  around	  the	  reader’s	  head,	  yet	  neither	  Bill	  nor	  the	  other	  patient	  acknowledge	  any	  strange	  turn	  of	  speech.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  phrase	  are	  linked	  to	  its	  meaning,	  “for	  the	  time	  being.”	  Firstly,	  this	  phrase	  speaks	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  state,	  characterized	  by	  a	  sort	  of	  hovering	  sensation	  between	  health	  and	  the	  assurance	  of	  a	  defined	  medical	  narrative,	  which	  begins	  with	  diagnosis.	  Bill	  and	  the	  other	  patients	  in	  the	  waiting	  room	  are	  not	  just	  waiting	  to	  see	  Dr.	  Petrov.	  They	  exist	  in	  a	  deeper,	  intangible	  waiting	  room,	  a	  sort	  of	  limbo	  made	  terrifying	  on	  account	  of	  there	  being	  no	  evidence	  that	  a	  diagnosis	  will	  emerge	  anytime	  soon,	  nor	  any	  suggestion	  that	  they	  will	  move	  toward	  health	  or	  progress	  according	  to	  a	  designated	  medical	  narrative.	  	  	   Derivation	  of	  the	  phrase	  “pro	  tem”	  illuminates	  another	  allusion	  to	  life	  within	  the	  pre-­‐diagnostic	  frame.	  The	  reader	  eventually	  asks	  why	  this	  patient	  utilizes	  such	  a	  vague,	  complex	  term	  over	  and	  over,	  instead	  of	  the	  simple	  “for	  the	  time	  being?”	  It	  is	  actually	  the	  indeterminate	  and	  complicated	  nature	  of	  this	  phrase	  that	  explains	  its	  existence	  in	  this	  conversation	  and	  in	  the	  space	  of	  the	  waiting	  room.	  Dr.	  Petrov	  has	  medicalized	  a	  simple	  phrase	  by	  giving	  it	  a	  Latin	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name,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  determined,	  scientifically	  backed	  diagnosis.	  Seeking	  structure,	  yet	  unable	  to	  find	  it	  via	  diagnosis,	  Dr.	  Petrov’s	  patients	  find	  it	  in	  the	  rigid,	  academic	  Latin	  language.	  The	  contrast	  between	  the	  reader	  noticing	  this	  strange	  phrase’s	  repetition	  and	  Bill’s	  failure	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  repeated,	  strange	  “pro	  tem”	  suggests	  the	  effect	  that	  this	  medicalized	  phrase	  has	  upon	  a	  patient	  in	  Bill’s	  position.	  Presented	  with	  a	  complex	  Latin	  name,	  the	  patient	  accepts	  it	  not	  only	  because	  the	  physician	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  both	  honest	  and	  sagacious,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  scientific	  tone	  of	  this	  phrase	  may	  provide	  some	  shred	  of	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  the	  disconcerting	  limbo	  period	  may	  be	  ending,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  being	  demarcated	  by	  the	  frame	  of	  diagnosis.	  	  	   At	  one	  point,	  Tim	  receives	  a	  diagnosis	  that	  melds	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  forced	  medicalization	  to	  create	  some	  level	  of	  diagnostic	  frame.	  As	  there	  is	  “no	  laboratory	  examination	  to	  confirm	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  the	  condition,”	  Tim’s	  doctor	  labels	  his	  disorder	  “benign	  idiopathic	  perambulation”	  (Ferris	  41).	  Similar	  to	  the	  language	  of	  “pro	  tem,”	  this	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  utilize	  the	  medical	  language	  of	  Latin,	  which	  most	  people	  are	  unfamiliar	  with,	  to	  support	  the	  image	  of	  modern	  medicine	  as	  an	  unquestionable	  source	  of	  forward	  progress.	  Increasing	  pressure	  from	  both	  Tim	  and	  the	  modern	  assumption	  that	  medicine	  can	  fix,	  or	  at	  least	  alleviate,	  any	  disorder	  leads	  to	  this	  diagnosis.	  Tim	  quickly	  notes	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  is	  meaningless,	  as	  the	  term	  “idiopathic”	  means	  “of	  unknown	  cause”	  and	  perambulation	  is	  simply	  medical	  terminology	  for	  walking.	  This	  diagnosis	  thus	  gives	  Tim	  no	  meaning,	  but	  simply	  acts	  as	  a	  veil	  over	  a	  void	  in	  medical	  comprehension.	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The	  name	  given	  to	  Tim’s	  disorder	  (benign	  idiopathic	  perambulation),	  beyond	  exhibiting	  an	  example	  of	  a	  failed	  veiling	  of	  medicine’s	  failure	  in	  this	  instance,	  both	  distances	  Tim	  from	  the	  medical	  world	  and	  shifts	  the	  burden	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  disease	  back	  onto	  him:	  the	  patient.	  Here,	  instead	  of	  locating	  and	  applying	  a	  known	  diagnostic	  name,	  the	  medical	  world	  creates	  one	  to	  apply	  to	  Tim’s	  condition.	  Yet	  this	  solution	  is	  doomed	  to	  fail	  because	  a	  diagnosis	  defines	  a	  condition,	  linking	  cause	  to	  deleterious	  effect.	  Unable	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  link,	  this	  particular	  “diagnosis”	  instead	  questions	  the	  deleteriousness	  of	  Tim’s	  symptoms	  by	  terming	  Tim’s	  disorder	  “benign.”	  But	  this	  disorder	  destroys	  Tim’s	  career,	  family,	  and	  life,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  “benign”	  in	  nature,	  illuminating	  a	  limitation	  in	  our	  dependence	  upon	  the	  diagnostic	  frame.	  This	  frame	  requires	  a	  biological	  understanding	  of	  a	  disease	  to	  name	  it—and	  thus	  dooms	  those	  whose	  symptoms	  are	  currently	  unexplainable	  by	  modern	  medicine	  to	  waiting,	  searching	  for	  an	  answer	  that	  does	  not	  yet	  exist,	  while	  failing	  to	  receive	  validation	  regarding	  the	  severity	  of	  their	  disease.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  non-­‐medical	  phrase	  failing	  to	  provide	  the	  structure	  and	  meaning	  that	  patients	  seek	  both	  reflects	  and	  contrasts	  the	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  in	  Meghan	  O’Rourke’s	  nonfiction	  account.	  She	  mentions	  suffering	  from	  “brain	  fog	  (a	  usual	  autoimmune	  symptom).”	  Here,	  the	  un-­‐testable	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  pairing	  of	  a	  real	  symptom,	  an	  inability	  to	  concentrate,	  with	  a	  vague	  and	  colloquial	  title.	  In	  a	  way,	  it	  perfectly	  contrasts	  the	  phrase	  “pro	  tem,”	  which	  contrarily	  hoped	  to	  provide	  meaning	  and	  structure	  through	  an	  elegant	  Latin	  title	  where	  none	  actually	  existed.	  Formal	  medical	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names	  are	  often	  expected	  to	  represent	  concretely	  understood	  symptoms,	  yet	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  The	  abstract	  qualities	  of	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  exclusion	  seem	  to	  bleed	  into	  very	  real	  symptoms,	  leaving	  a	  patient	  without	  the	  structure	  that	  comes	  from	  naming	  a	  diagnosis	  or	  even	  a	  relatively	  straightforward	  symptom	  like	  confusion.	  	  Although	  diagnosis	  promises	  to	  draw	  borders	  between	  what	  is	  diseased	  and	  what	  is	  healthy,	  the	  narratives	  of	  Meghan	  O’Rourke,	  Joshua	  Ferris,	  and	  Alan	  Lightman	  expose	  a	  unique	  flaw	  in	  this	  promise	  as	  presented	  in	  contemporary	  literature.	  The	  indescribability	  of	  a	  disorder	  does	  not	  render	  it	  benign,	  yet	  our	  modern	  world	  of	  medicine	  seems	  to	  stall	  when	  it	  fails	  to	  find	  diagnosis.	  Patients	  are	  left	  struggling	  with	  confusing	  disruptions	  in	  agency	  around	  their	  own	  bodies,	  and	  as	  their	  diseases	  worsen,	  their	  subjective	  experiences	  become	  less	  and	  less	  valuable	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  medicine,	  replaced	  by	  a	  blinded	  focus	  upon	  what	  is	  objective	  and	  quantifiable.	  The	  afflicted	  try	  and	  fail	  to	  exhibit	  a	  clinical	  gaze	  upon	  themselves,	  attempting	  to	  delineate	  healthy	  from	  disordered	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  diagnosis.	  Yet	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  benign	  is	  a	  strange	  one	  itself—in	  reality	  health	  is	  always	  a	  spectrum,	  as	  nobody	  is	  perfectly	  healthy,	  and	  with	  enough	  inspection	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  massively	  complex	  human	  body	  is	  always	  failing	  on	  some	  level.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  modern	  obsession	  and	  reliance	  upon	  the	  diagnostic	  frame	  traps	  the	  undiagnosed	  between	  healthy	  and	  being	  within	  the	  “medical	  narrative,”	  on	  a	  path	  toward	  a	  return	  to	  health.	  Perhaps	  an	  acceptance	  that	  health	  and	  disease	  are	  simply	  different	  locations	  on	  a	  spectrum	  of	  bodily	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function	  would	  acknowledge	  or	  even	  alleviate	  some	  of	  the	  identity	  and	  agency	  issues	  of	  Tim,	  Bill,	  and	  Megan	  O’Rourke.	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Chapter	  3	  
The	  Cancer	  Diagnosis	  _____________________________________________________________________	  	  
Cancer,	  the	  diagnosis	  our	  society	  may	  be	  most	  familiar	  with,	  reveals	  a	  unique	  perspective	  on	  the	  diagnostic	  effect.	  Cancer	  can	  affect	  patients	  of	  all	  ages,	  so	  when	  a	  very	  young	  child	  is	  diagnosed	  with	  cancer,	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  disease	  extends	  beyond	  the	  child	  and	  onto	  their	  parents	  and	  family,	  who	  face	  a	  sort	  of	  displaced	  diagnosis	  as	  they	  must	  themselves	  grapple	  with	  what	  the	  disorder	  means.	  Diagnosis	  promises	  to	  reduce	  the	  distinct	  aspects	  of	  the	  illness	  experience	  (physical,	  psychosocial,	  familial,	  etc.)	  into	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  medical	  term,	  yet	  this	  chapter	  will	  illustrate	  various	  examples	  in	  which	  diagnosis	  fails	  to	  do	  this.	  A	  medicalized	  term	  cannot	  account	  for	  all	  of	  the	  dimensions	  terminal	  illness	  assumes	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  a	  patient	  and	  their	  family.	  Other	  components	  of	  illness,	  such	  as	  the	  melding	  of	  home	  and	  hospital,	  slip	  out	  of	  the	  attempted	  diagnostic	  unification,	  as	  diagnosis	  implies	  but	  does	  not	  ultimately	  deliver	  a	  unifying	  narrative	  including	  bodily,	  social,	  and	  psychological	  symptoms	  that	  end	  with	  treatment	  and	  cure.	  The	  tension	  from	  the	  promised,	  yet	  unattainable,	  encompassing	  of	  an	  illness	  experience	  into	  a	  diagnosis	  is	  exhibited	  throughout	  the	  cancer	  narratives	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  This	  strain	  is	  palpable	  in	  Lorrie	  Moore’s	  “People	  Like	  That	  Are	  The	  Only	  People	  Here:	  Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  (referred	  to	  hereafter	  as	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“Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”).	  The	  Mother	  (unnamed)	  in	  Moore’s	  short	  story	  engages	  in	  a	  disembodying	  attempt	  to	  accept	  the	  diseased	  aspects	  of	  her	  child	  (referred	  to	  as	  “the	  Baby”)	  as	  her	  own.	  The	  malignant	  tumor	  that	  appeared	  on	  a	  scan	  of	  the	  Baby’s	  kidney,	  the	  Mother	  feels,	  must	  have	  been	  “her	  kidney”	  as	  she	  was	  “standing	  very	  close”	  when	  the	  scan	  was	  performed	  (Moore	  468).	  Diagnosis	  specifically	  identifies	  the	  ill,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  creates	  a	  boundary	  between	  them	  and	  the	  healthy.	  When	  faced	  with	  an	  exposure	  of	  disorder	  within	  her	  child,	  the	  Mother	  seeks	  to	  lessen	  the	  imagined	  boundary	  between	  her	  and	  the	  Baby.	  She	  attempts	  to	  deny	  this	  perceptual	  border	  by	  citing	  her	  physical	  proximity,	  that	  she	  was	  “very	  close.”	  Yet	  Moore’s	  farcical	  presentation	  of	  the	  Mother	  seeking	  to	  “make	  the	  [Baby’s]	  blood	  hers,	  the	  tumor	  hers”	  exhibits	  the	  confusion	  present	  in	  the	  Mother’s	  response	  to	  a	  diagnostic	  frame,	  as	  the	  psychological	  dimensions	  of	  disease	  cannot	  simply	  be	  swapped	  out	  for	  the	  physical.	  Her	  confusion	  stems	  from	  the	  feeling	  of	  absolute	  connection	  between	  mother	  and	  child,	  which	  fiercely	  compels	  her	  to	  take	  on	  the	  Baby’s	  disorder,	  yet	  she	  is	  unable	  to	  assume	  this	  particular	  burden.	  Specifically,	  the	  Mother’s	  adjacency	  to	  her	  child	  cannot	  eliminate	  the	  boundary	  constructed	  by	  a	  cancer	  diagnosis	  between	  her	  and	  the	  Baby.	  	  	   Another	  example	  of	  perceived	  boundaries	  between	  cancer	  and	  familial	  relationships	  is	  the	  interactive	  video	  game	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer,	  which	  allows	  a	  player	  to	  follow	  the	  story	  of	  Ryan	  and	  Amy	  Green	  as	  their	  son	  Joel	  struggles	  with	  cancer.	  Compared	  to	  the	  Mother’s	  active,	  vocal	  attempts	  to	  join	  the	  Baby	  in	  the	  space	  of	  illness	  in	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk,”	  father	  Ryan	  Green’s	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experience	  in	  the	  interactive	  video	  game	  is	  portrayed	  as	  more	  of	  a	  passive	  inhabiting	  of	  the	  space	  of	  his	  son’s	  illness.	  As	  he	  sits	  holding	  Joel,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  radiant	  green	  chemotherapy	  seeps	  toward	  both	  of	  them	  yet	  is	  never	  shown	  entering	  either	  body,	  even	  when	  the	  player	  moves	  closer	  to	  viewing	  the	  pair.	  Given	  only	  this	  scene,	  a	  viewer	  wouldn’t	  know	  who	  is	  sick	  and	  who	  isn’t.	  Yet	  the	  player	  does	  know	  that	  the	  child	  is	  ill	  and	  that	  Ryan	  is	  perfectly	  healthy,	  and	  Ryan’s	  presentation	  as	  possibly	  receiving	  chemotherapy	  instead	  of	  Joel	  is	  confusing	  and	  somewhat	  disconcerting.	  This	  chapter	  of	  the	  game,	  entitled	  “On	  Hospital	  Time,”	  is	  constructed	  so	  the	  viewer	  is	  far	  from	  the	  father-­‐son	  duo	  and	  must	  sweep	  across	  the	  screen	  to	  find	  them.	  The	  bare	  quality	  of	  the	  room	  pushes	  the	  player	  to	  focus	  on	  Ryan	  and	  Joel—the	  effect	  of	  which	  is	  that	  because	  the	  entirety	  of	  their	  bodies	  are	  in	  view,	  the	  huge	  size	  disparity	  between	  them	  is	  undeniable.	  Even	  with	  their	  bodies	  laid	  on	  top	  of	  one	  another,	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  people,	  one	  large	  and	  clothed	  and	  the	  other	  small	  and	  in	  only	  a	  diaper,	  is	  thrust	  into	  the	  viewer’s	  experience.	  This	  scene	  emphasizes	  the	  impossibility	  of	  Ryan’s	  attempt	  to	  inhabit	  Joel’s	  perspective	  on	  account	  of	  both	  his	  disorder	  and	  his	  identity,	  represented	  by	  disparities	  in	  size	  and	  age.	  Although	  in	  this	  scene	  Ryan	  and	  Joel	  are	  blended	  in	  the	  viewer’s	  inability	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  receiving	  chemotherapy	  and	  who	  is	  diseased,	  a	  tension	  emerges	  in	  that	  a	  firm	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  
Figure	  1:	  Ryan	  holds	  Joel.	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simultaneously	  exists	  and	  highlights	  how	  Ryan	  is	  both	  in	  the	  middle	  of,	  yet	  separated	  from,	  Joel’s	  diagnosis.	  	  	  Later	  in	  the	  same	  chapter	  of	  the	  game,	  uncomfortable	  physical	  dynamics	  between	  Ryan	  and	  Joel	  emphasize	  Ryan’s	  inability	  to	  reside	  in	  Joel’s	  diagnostic	  frame.	  Lying	  on	  a	  small	  pullout	  couch	  in	  Joel’s	  room,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2,	  Ryan	  seems	  gigantic.	  Try	  as	  he	  might,	  he	  cannot	  fit	  into	  a	  bed	  so	  small.	  He	  can’t	  fit	  naturally	  into	  this	  space,	  because	  it	  was	  built	  for	  pediatric	  cancer,	  and	  despite	  his	  psychological	  ties	  to	  his	  son’s	  predicament,	  Ryan’s	  age	  and	  health	  deny	  him	  the	  ability	  to	  fully	  inhabit	  it.	  When	  the	  player	  is	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  play	  from	  Ryan’s	  perspective,	  the	  only	  action	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  is	  to	  stroke	  Joel’s	  head,	  and	  Joel’s	  only	  response	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  giggle.	  Communication	  beyond	  simple	  physical	  touch	  is	  essentially	  nonexistent.	  The	  player	  thus	  feels	  a	  sense	  of	  Ryan’s	  frustration	  at	  being	  unable	  to	  explain	  to	  Joel	  why	  he	  feels	  how	  he	  does;	  he	  desires	  nothing	  more	  than	  to	  explain	  the	  situation	  to	  his	  son,	  which	  is	  the	  purpose	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  diagnosis,	  yet	  he	  cannot.	  Balloons	  formed	  from	  hospital	  gloves	  float	  onscreen,	  and	  Joel	  sees	  them	  not	  as	  medicinal	  tools,	  but	  as	  just	  toys.	  The	  complete	  silence	  in	  this	  scene	  emphasizes	  the	  solitude	  Ryan	  faces,	  as	  he	  bears	  the	  weight	  of	  his	  son’s	  diagnosis	  yet	  cannot	  utilize	  it	  to	  pass	  on	  any	  meaning	  or	  understanding	  to	  his	  young	  son.	  Ryan’s	  search	  for	  meaning	  is	  complicated	  further	  as	  he	  is	  helpless	  to	  
Figure	  2:	  Ryan	  and	  Joel	  sleep.	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communicate	  any	  understanding	  of	  Joel’s	  situation	  to	  Joel	  himself.	  Diagnosis	  promises	  to	  assist	  the	  Greens	  in	  constructing	  a	  frame	  for	  Joel’s	  disease,	  yet	  this	  effect	  is	  ultimately	  limited	  by	  Joel’s	  youthful	  ignorance	  of	  language	  and	  any	  meaning	  it	  may	  convey.	  	  	   The	  Mother’s	  response	  to	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  diagnosis	  in	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  is	  an	  immediate	  attempt	  to	  transform	  her	  child’s	  diagnosis	  into	  what	  she	  finds	  most	  familiar:	  language.	  The	  Baby’s	  doctor	  explains	  that	  “what	  we	  have	  here	  is	  a	  Wilms’	  tumor”	  and	  as	  a	  writer	  herself,	  the	  Mother	  immediately	  responds	  with	  “Wilms’?	  Is	  that	  apostrophe	  s	  or	  s	  apostrophe?”	  Presented	  with	  a	  diagnosis	  whose	  medical	  meaning	  is	  inaccessible	  for	  a	  non-­‐health	  professional,	  the	  Mother	  tries	  to	  break	  down	  the	  disorder	  into	  its	  linguistic	  pieces.	  The	  enormity	  of	  the	  diagnosis,	  wrapped	  in	  the	  word	  “cancer,”	  must	  be	  understood	  and	  framed	  somehow,	  so	  the	  Mother	  attempts	  to	  utilize	  her	  literary	  toolbox,	  turning	  to	  grammar	  and	  spelling	  because	  “spelling	  can	  be	  important,”	  the	  Mother	  thinks	  to	  herself.	  The	  term	  “Wilms’	  tumor”	  presents	  her	  with	  no	  meaning	  or	  structure	  of	  her	  child’s	  disorder	  and	  its	  effects,	  yet	  she	  desperately	  seeks	  to	  understand	  it	  and	  tries	  to	  use	  language	  as	  a	  frame.	  This	  attempt	  proves	  unsuccessful,	  though,	  as	  the	  doctor	  replies	  “S	  apostrophe,”	  which	  momentarily	  promises	  some	  meaning;	  but	  the	  meaning	  is	  stripped	  away	  as	  he	  follows	  with	  “I	  think.”	  This	  hesitation	  shows	  that	  the	  doctor	  sees	  no	  meaning	  in	  specific	  language,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  that	  the	  location	  of	  the	  apostrophe	  will	  transfer	  no	  understanding	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  to	  the	  Mother.	  (Moore	  468)	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   The	  father	  in	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer,	  Ryan	  Green,	  has	  a	  related	  yet	  distinctly	  quantitatively	  oriented	  response	  to	  hearing	  a	  physician	  diagnose	  his	  son	  with	  end-­‐stage	  cancer.	  The	  doctor	  states	  “this	  is	  a	  tragedy”	  and	  “it	  is	  fatal,	  no	  treatments	  are	  curative,”	  leaving	  no	  room	  for	  hope	  for	  parents	  Ryan	  and	  Amy.	  The	  term	  “tragedy,”	  while	  the	  doctors	  likely	  hoped	  to	  express	  empathy,	  instead	  imposes	  a	  “tragic”	  narrative	  upon	  the	  Green’s	  and	  their	  son	  Joel.	  Faced	  not	  only	  with	  a	  diagnosis,	  but	  with	  the	  confirmation	  that	  their	  time	  left	  with	  Joel	  will	  be	  characterized	  by	  grief,	  Ryan	  thinks	  to	  himself	  “size	  matters:	  if	  I	  know	  how	  big	  it	  is	  I	  can	  size	  it	  up”	  (That	  Dragon,	  Cancer).	  Like	  the	  Mother	  in	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  Ryan	  immediately	  seeks	  to	  find	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  diagnosis	  that	  allows	  him	  to	  frame	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  he	  can	  understand,	  but	  he	  tries	  to	  transform	  it	  into	  a	  physical	  entity,	  instead	  of	  a	  literary	  one,	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  given	  some	  measure	  of	  size,	  perhaps	  he	  can	  mentally	  envision	  Joel’s	  diagnosis,	  hold	  it,	  and	  mentally	  
grapple	  with	  it.	  	  	  	   	  Yet	  the	  Greens’	  physician	  in	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer,	  like	  in	  Lorrie	  Moore’s	  story,	  immediately	  states	  “the	  tumor	  is	  relatively	  small;	  unfortunately,	  size	  doesn’t	  really	  matter	  here.”	  This	  scenario	  mirrors	  the	  Mother’s	  situation	  almost	  perfectly—Ryan	  received	  the	  type	  of	  answer	  he	  sought,	  yet	  the	  validity	  and	  usefulness	  of	  that	  answer,	  with	  respect	  to	  absorbing	  and	  assimilating	  the	  diagnosis,	  is	  immediately	  stripped	  away.	  Juxtapositions	  of	  the	  Mother’s	  and	  Ryan’s	  attempts	  to	  frame	  a	  disorder	  with	  a	  medical	  professional’s	  denial	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  reveals	  the	  inherent	  inaccessibility	  of	  diagnosis.	  No	  literary	  or	  quantitative	  transformation	  of	  diagnosis	  can	  bring	  with	  it	  psychological	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comprehension	  of	  a	  diagnosis’	  significance:	  what	  the	  diagnosis	  portends	  about	  their	  future	  or	  how	  Joel	  and	  the	  Baby	  will	  be	  affected.	  Such	  attempts	  to	  grapple	  with	  diagnosis	  are	  natural	  responses	  to	  a	  familiar	  situation,	  but	  they	  are	  ultimately	  in	  vain.	  Throughout	  the	  powerful	  scene	  described	  above,	  Joel	  simply	  giggles	  and	  plays	  with	  a	  colorful	  toy,	  yet	  his	  parents	  leave	  their	  meeting	  with	  Joel’s	  physician	  with	  only	  an	  inaccessible	  name,	  holding	  little	  more	  understanding	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  than	  blissfully	  ignorant	  Joel	  does.	  A	  diagnosis	  of	  cancer	  gives	  neither	  medical	  explanation	  nor	  prediction	  of	  how	  Joel’s	  illness	  will	  affect	  the	  familial	  dynamic;	  if	  anything,	  it	  denies	  Ryan’s	  attempts	  to	  understand	  Joel’s	  cancer.	  All	  the	  Greens	  leave	  with	  is	  an	  affirmation	  that	  their	  narrative	  will	  end	  in	  Joel’s	  death.	  	  	   Ryan	  Green’s	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  his	  son	  Joel’s	  diagnosis	  through	  visualizing	  the	  size	  of	  his	  tumor	  appears	  again	  in	  the	  video	  game.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  scenes	  of	  the	  game,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3,	  the	  player	  watches	  Ryan	  floating	  underwater,	  surrounded	  by	  an	  arcade	  game,	  discussed	  later,	  and	  three	  thorny,	  eerie,	  pitch-­‐black	  masses.	  The	  only	  sound	  is	  a	  pulsing	  throb,	  like	  a	  human	  heartbeat,	  which	  the	  masses	  move	  along	  with.	  For	  a	  minute	  or	  two,	  all	  the	  player	  can	  do	  is	  look	  around	  the	  blue	  sea	  and	  contemplate	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  scene.	  Even	  after	  the	  doctor’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  size	  of	  Joel’s	  tumors	  doesn’t	  matter,	  
Figure	  3:	  Ryan	  submerged.	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Ryan	  and	  Amy	  have	  chosen	  to	  portray	  Joel’s	  diagnosis	  through	  the	  objective	  form	  of	  ever-­‐present	  and	  menacing	  tumors,	  physically	  inside	  Joel	  but	  figuratively	  surrounding	  them.	  This	  scene	  expresses	  their	  lack	  of	  agency	  even	  within	  the	  physical	  materialization	  of	  Joel’s	  diagnosis,	  which	  they	  as	  parents	  themselves	  created	  in	  their	  quest	  for	  comprehension	  and	  control.	  Although	  the	  tumor-­‐size	  perspective	  doesn’t	  immediately	  give	  Ryan	  the	  framework	  of	  diagnosis	  he	  hopes	  for,	  the	  mental,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  digital,	  materialization	  of	  disorder	  persists.	  Perhaps	  creating	  physical	  manifestations	  of	  diagnosis	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  failed	  struggle	  to	  render	  the	  meaning	  of	  diagnosis	  accessible.	  	  	   Although	  a	  foreboding	  and	  terrifying	  presentation	  of	  tumors	  and	  cancer	  seems	  natural,	  Susan	  Sontag’s	  landmark	  1978	  essay	  “Illness	  as	  Metaphor”	  exposes	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  social	  discussion	  and	  representational	  framing,	  specifically	  metaphor,	  has	  shaped	  this	  attitude.	  For	  decades,	  cancer	  has	  been	  portrayed	  as	  a	  disease	  in	  which	  patients	  are	  stripped	  of	  energy	  while	  the	  tumors	  themselves	  are	  “ferociously	  energetic,”	  madly	  multiplying	  and	  spreading	  (Sontag	  66).	  Sontag	  theorizes	  that	  this	  presentation	  of	  tumors	  shapes	  the	  patient	  experience,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  3.	  There,	  Joel’s	  tumors	  literally	  surround	  Ryan,	  pulsing	  as	  he	  floats	  motionless.	  This	  scene	  also	  extends	  Sontag’s	  theory—while	  Sontag	  referred	  to	  a	  patient,	  the	  video	  game	  imagery	  shows	  how	  her	  theory	  can	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  parents	  of	  a	  cancer-­‐stricken	  child.	  In	  grappling	  with	  diagnosis	  themselves,	  the	  cancer	  threatens	  not	  only	  their	  child	  but	  the	  parents’	  way	  of	  life	  as	  well.	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   In	  her	  own	  portrayal	  of	  tumors,	  the	  Mother	  in	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  demonstrates	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  representation	  of	  cancer	  that	  Sontag’s	  theory	  protests.	  Sontag	  argues	  that	  notions	  of	  cancer	  as	  the	  “killer	  disease”	  leads	  to	  “punitive”	  notions	  of	  disorder,	  in	  which	  the	  “illness	  is	  the	  culprit”	  and	  patients	  are	  thus	  represented	  as	  victims	  (54).	  The	  Mother	  views	  a	  tumor	  as	  “differentiated	  muscle	  and	  bone	  cells,	  a	  clump	  of	  wild	  nothing	  and	  its	  mad,	  ambitious	  desire	  to	  be	  something”	  (Moore	  477).	  The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  quote	  reveals	  a	  distinct	  biological	  lens	  that	  is	  suddenly	  terrifying	  because	  how	  can	  “differentiated	  muscle	  and	  bone	  cells”	  be	  delineated	  from	  normal	  muscle	  and	  bone	  cells	  that	  make	  up	  the	  Baby?	  Where	  can	  the	  line	  between	  cancer	  and	  baby	  be	  drawn	  if	  a	  tumor	  is	  simply	  the	  Baby’s	  cells	  that	  have	  changed	  slightly?	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  Mother	  immediately	  switches	  to	  the	  frame	  that	  Sontag	  discredits,	  one	  of	  a	  tumor	  as	  a	  “wild	  nothing”	  personified	  with	  an	  “ambitious	  desire	  to	  be	  something.”	  Although	  this	  frame	  asserts	  that	  a	  maleficent	  entity	  seeks	  to	  proliferate	  and	  wreak	  havoc	  inside	  her	  son,	  it	  allows	  her	  to	  preserve	  the	  image	  of	  the	  Baby	  as	  clean	  and	  innocent,	  infected	  by	  a	  specific	  other.	  In	  demonizing	  the	  tumor,	  the	  Mother	  can	  save	  the	  uncontaminated	  image	  of	  her	  child.	  Writer	  and	  literary	  critic	  Anatole	  Broyard,	  who	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  essays	  about	  his	  experience	  with	  his	  own	  terminal	  cancer,	  disagrees	  with	  Sontag’s	  quarrel	  with	  metaphor	  and	  supports	  the	  role	  that	  metaphor	  can	  play,	  as	  in	  instances	  like	  the	  Mother’s	  turn	  to	  tumors	  as	  “wild	  nothing.”	  In	  discussing	  only	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  metaphor,	  he	  posits	  that	  Sontag	  “throws	  the	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bath”	  because	  “at	  the	  very	  least,	  they	  are	  a	  relief	  from	  medical	  terminology”	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(Broyard	  18).	  Broyard	  hints	  at	  an	  important	  idea	  here,	  but	  doesn’t	  reach	  far	  enough.	  The	  “wild	  nothing”	  metaphor	  goes	  beyond	  providing	  a	  relief	  from	  medical	  phrases	  like	  “differentiated	  muscle	  and	  bone	  cells.”	  Metaphor	  provides	  an	  escape	  from	  an	  inherently	  objective	  scientific	  reality	  that	  cannot	  be	  combated	  or	  grappled	  with	  through	  words.	  Metaphor	  releases	  the	  Mother	  from	  the	  black	  and	  white,	  diseased	  or	  healthy	  mindsets	  of	  science,	  and	  allows	  her	  to	  create	  her	  own	  perspective	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  disease.	  While	  metaphors	  like	  the	  “wild	  nothing”	  of	  a	  tumor	  allow	  for	  the	  Mother	  to	  distinctly	  locate	  the	  Baby	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  cancer,	  they	  also	  provide	  a	  flexibility	  in	  representation	  that	  returns	  to	  the	  Mother	  some	  level	  of	  control	  in	  framing	  her	  life	  and	  the	  life	  of	  her	  child.	  Sontag	  argues	  that	  terminology	  about	  cancer	  such	  as	  “mutant”	  cells	  presented	  as	  a	  “demonic	  possession—tumors	  are	  ‘malignant’	  or	  ‘benign’	  forces”	  shapes	  cancer	  into	  a	  disease	  of	  the	  other	  (64).	  This	  sheds	  light	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  the	  arcade	  game	  floating	  near	  Joel’s	  tumors	  in	  figure	  3.	  The	  player	  finally	  floats	  to	  the	  arcade	  to	  play	  “Joel	  the	  Baby	  Knight,”	  where	  he	  or	  she	  assumes	  the	  role	  of	  Joel,	  chased	  by	  a	  demonic,	  fire-­‐breathing	  dragon	  named	  “Cancer.”	  This	  game	  within	  a	  video	  game	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  through	  which	  Ryan	  and	  Amy	  Green	  express	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Joel’s	  diagnosis	  has	  removed	  their	  agency	  and	  freedom	  to	  choose	  how	  to	  live	  their	  lives.	  A	  player	  can	  move	  through	  the	  video	  game,	  yet	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  win,	  only	  to	  dodge	  the	  dragon’s	  fireballs	  until	  Joel’s	  fifteen	  allotted	  lives	  are	  spent.	  Implicit	  in	  the	  simplicity	  of	  this	  game	  is	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Greens’	  lives	  have	  been	  reduced	  to	  making	  their	  way	  down	  a	  predetermined	  path,	  like	  a	  level	  in	  a	  video	  game,	  dodging	  fireballs	  spewing	  from	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the	  mouth	  of	  Cancer	  itself	  until	  eventually	  the	  player	  succumbs.	  The	  Greens	  are	  a	  deeply	  religious	  family,	  perhaps	  leading	  to	  their	  view	  of	  cancer	  as	  a	  massive,	  red-­‐eyed	  creature	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  devil.	  Sontag’s	  theory	  is	  useful	  in	  this	  context,	  showing	  that	  that	  although	  the	  Greens	  created	  their	  image	  of	  cancer	  as	  a	  dragon	  as	  a	  means	  of	  externalizing	  the	  threat	  to	  Joel,	  the	  use	  of	  a	  demonic	  metaphor	  strips	  the	  Greens	  of	  agency	  because	  cancer’s	  representation	  as	  a	  massive	  dragon	  provides	  only	  a	  single	  (dreading)	  thought	  in	  the	  player’s	  mind.	  How	  can	  a	  tiny	  baby	  like	  Joel	  ever	  defeat,	  or	  even	  slow,	  such	  a	  beast?	  The	  very	  object	  of	  the	  Greens’	  attempt	  to	  materialize	  the	  threat	  to	  Joel	  actually	  constricts	  their	  psychological	  ability	  to	  fight	  his	  cancer.	  	  	   “Joel	  the	  Baby	  Knight”	  is	  initially	  presented	  as	  a	  bedtime	  story	  to	  Ryan	  and	  Amy’s	  other	  children,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  explain	  how	  cancer	  has	  affected	  Joel’s	  life.	  Their	  use	  of	  narrative,	  here	  of	  the	  ancient	  knight-­‐versus-­‐dragon	  tale,	  shows	  a	  method	  of	  assimilating	  diagnosis	  into	  the	  Green’s’	  daily	  life,	  specifically	  of	  staying	  connected	  to	  their	  other	  children.	  The	  creation	  of	  “Joel	  the	  Baby	  Knight,”	  as	  well	  as	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer	  as	  a	  whole,	  exemplifies	  how	  turning	  to	  narrative	  can	  creatively	  usurp	  the	  power	  that	  diagnosis	  and	  its	  expected	  narrative	  of	  “tragedy”	  have	  stolen	  from	  the	  Green	  family.	  Broyard	  labels	  his	  experience	  of	  being	  diagnosed	  with	  cancer	  as	  a	  “series	  of	  disconnected	  shocks,”	  and	  in	  writing	  his	  essays	  he	  found	  a	  way	  to	  make	  whole	  again	  a	  life	  that	  felt	  utterly	  fragmented	  by	  the	  unpredictable	  nature	  of	  cancer	  (19).	  Medical	  explanations,	  though	  they	  may	  provide	  the	  most	  likely	  series	  of	  events,	  can	  “flatten	  the	  story	  of	  illness”	  (Broyard	  66).	  After	  diagnosis	  reduced	  him	  to	  a	  “cancer	  patient,”	  and	  his	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experience	  began	  to	  turn	  into	  feeling	  like	  a	  laundry	  list	  of	  symptoms,	  charts,	  and	  numbers,	  his	  series	  of	  essays	  returned	  to	  his	  life	  the	  three-­‐dimensionality	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  human	  experience.	  In	  a	  sense	  his	  life	  became	  narrative,	  as	  his	  “existence	  …	  had	  taken	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  meter,	  as	  in	  poetry	  or	  taxis,”	  a	  meter	  controlled	  by	  him	  that	  defied	  the	  cancer	  diagnosis’	  grip	  (Broyard	  3).	  	  	   Paul	  Kalanithi’s	  When	  Breath	  Becomes	  Air,	  a	  memoir	  about	  his	  final	  days	  as	  a	  neurosurgeon	  diagnosed	  with	  terminal	  lung	  cancer,	  approaches	  the	  role	  of	  narrative	  creating	  agency	  in	  the	  face	  of	  diagnosis	  on	  two	  levels.	  Firstly,	  the	  book	  itself	  is	  Kalanithi’s	  method	  of	  understanding	  the	  transition	  from	  doctor	  to	  patient,	  as	  he	  figures	  out	  how	  to	  receive	  a	  diagnosis	  after	  years	  of	  distributing	  them.	  But	  inside	  Kalanithi’s	  story	  is	  a	  second	  turn	  to	  narrative	  to	  understand	  living	  within	  the	  diagnostic	  frame	  of	  cancer.	  Kalanithi,	  “lost	  in	  a	  wasteland	  of	  [his]	  own	  mortality”	  after	  receiving	  his	  diagnosis,	  began	  to	  read	  literature	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  illness	  such	  as	  Tolstoy’s	  Ivan	  Lynch	  and	  B.S.	  Johnson’s	  The	  
Unfortunates	  (Kalanithi	  148-­‐150).	  Kalanithi	  recognized	  that	  the	  certainty	  expected	  of	  diagnosis,	  that	  it	  would	  teach	  a	  patient	  how	  his	  or	  her	  life	  will	  be	  altered	  by	  disease,	  could	  never	  be	  fully	  realized.	  No	  “curves	  of	  survival	  statistics”	  could	  tell	  him	  how	  to	  view	  cancer’s	  infiltration	  of	  his	  life	  and	  his	  identity	  (148).	  Although	  diagnosis	  provides	  a	  name	  for	  the	  disorder	  within	  a	  body,	  it	  can’t	  explain	  how	  the	  individual	  experience	  of	  a	  particular	  illness	  will	  change	  a	  patient’s	  identity	  as	  well	  as	  his	  or	  her	  body.	  Yet	  for	  Kalanithi,	  literature	  can	  begin	  to	  answer	  this	  question.	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   Kalanithi	  explains	  that	  in	  his	  perspective,	  patients	  do	  not	  seek	  “scientific	  knowledge	  that	  doctors	  hide”	  but	  truly	  search	  for	  “existential	  authenticity”	  and	  “oracular	  wisdom”	  (Kalanithi	  135,	  180).	  Throughout	  his	  story,	  Kalanithi’s	  motto	  becomes	  the	  unforgettable	  last	  words	  of	  Samuel	  Beckett’s	  The	  Unnameable:	  “I	  can’t	  go	  on.	  I’ll	  go	  on”	  (Kalanithi	  149).	  Creating	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer	  allowed	  the	  Greens	  to	  discover	  how	  to	  fit	  Joel’s	  bewildering	  cancer	  diagnosis	  into	  their	  family’s	  life,	  because	  even	  through	  the	  shock	  and	  confusion	  of	  diagnosis,	  life	  must	  still	  continue	  on.	  Figures	  2	  (Ryan	  Green	  appearing	  huge	  on	  a	  hospital	  pullout	  bed)	  and	  4	  speak	  to	  how	  living	  with	  Joel’s	  cancer	  has	  removed	  the	  spaces	  of	  “home”	  and	  of	  “the	  hospital”	  and	  instead	  given	  the	  Greens	  a	  strange	  melding	  of	  the	  two	  in	  which	  to	  live.	  Again,	  the	  removed,	  distant	  perspective	  of	  Ryan	  sleeping	  with	  Joel	  on	  a	  tiny	  bed	  expresses	  the	  impossibility	  of	  any	  hospital	  ever	  being	  a	  true	  home.	  The	  bare	  walls	  emphasize	  this	  reality—yet	  because	  of	  the	  extensive	  chemotherapy	  required	  for	  Joel’s	  treatment,	  the	  Greens	  must	  spend	  more	  time	  at	  the	  hospital	  than	  their	  own	  house.	  	  	  Figure	  4	  (next	  page)	  shows	  how	  the	  Greens’	  house	  is	  no	  longer	  just	  a	  space	  of	  living.	  Diagnosis,	  although	  it	  provided	  a	  medical	  name	  for	  Joel’s	  inner	  disorder,	  gave	  no	  warning	  for	  how	  the	  Greens’	  image	  of	  home	  would	  be	  altered	  by	  cancer.	  Joel’s	  cancer	  has	  shaped	  his	  room	  into,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  his	  family,	  a	  lonely	  and	  isolated	  space.	  In	  the	  chapter	  “Adrift”	  the	  player	  is	  exposed	  to	  this	  image	  as	  he	  or	  she	  stands	  in	  Joel’s	  room	  while	  simultaneously	  hearing	  crashing	  waves	  and	  noticing	  the	  beam	  of	  a	  lighthouse	  over	  the	  surrounding	  sea.	  This	  imagery	  communicates	  that	  because	  of	  Joel’s	  extensive	  treatment	  and	  the	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unpredictability	  of	  his	  disorder,	  home	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  space	  of	  comfort	  and	  security,	  but	  one	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  Is	  Joel’s	  room	  still	  Joel’s	  room	  if	  he	  now	  lives	  in	  the	  hospital?	  The	  tension	  of	  assimilating	  a	  cancer	  diagnosis	  into	  family	  life	  is	  further	  expressed	  by	  a	  background	  conversation	  occurring	  in	  this	  scene,	  as	  Joel’s	  brother	  tells	  his	  parents	  “Disneyland	  sounds	  fun,	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  miss	  school	  and	  make	  up	  my	  homework”	  (That	  Dragon,	  Cancer).	  This	  statement	  reminds	  the	  player	  that	  although	  the	  undeniable	  presence	  of	  terminal	  illness	  distracts	  from	  the	  demands	  and	  affirmations	  of	  ordinary	  life,	  life	  must	  go	  on	  for	  the	  Greens.	  Although	  the	  family	  sought	  meaning	  and	  some	  level	  of	  prediction	  from	  diagnosis,	  they	  cannot	  let	  Joel’s	  cancer	  envelop	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  reality,	  even	  if	  this	  reality	  must	  occur	  in	  a	  strange	  new	  space	  between	  home	  and	  hospital,	  somewhere	  simultaneously	  known	  and	  unexpected.	  One	  scene	  in	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  expresses	  a	  similar	  idea,	  but	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  Baby	  remaining	  a	  normal	  child	  despite	  his	  diagnosis.	  	  Sitting	  in	  the	  waiting	  room,	  the	  Baby	  wants	  to	  play	  with	  another	  child’s	  toy,	  Ned’s	  “little	  deflated	  rubber	  ball”	  with	  an	  “intriguing	  curling	  hose.”	  The	  two	  fight	  over	  the	  toy	  until	  Ned’s	  mother	  runs	  over,	  shouting	  “Stop	  that!	  Stop	  it!	  …	  This	  is	  drawing	  fluid	  from	  Neddy’s	  liver!”	  (Moore	  476)	  In	  the	  case	  of	  this	  work,	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  pediatric	  cancer	  has	  literally	  become	  a	  place:	  “Peed	  Onk,”	  short	  for	  
Figure	  4:	  The	  Greens’	  house,	  adrift	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pediatric	  oncology,	  meaning	  “children’s	  cancer.”	  Yet	  even	  in	  this	  diagnosis-­‐infused	  room	  the	  Baby	  is	  still	  just	  a	  baby,	  inserting	  some	  level	  of	  comedy	  into	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  tragedy	  that	  has	  reshaped	  this	  family’s	  story.	  This	  scene	  parallels	  Joel’s	  playing	  with	  hospital	  glove	  balloons	  in	  That	  Dragon,	  Cancer	  because,	  although	  a	  pediatric-­‐cancer	  diagnosis	  changes	  a	  child’s	  life	  and	  that	  of	  the	  child’s	  family,	  creative	  narrative	  demonstrates	  that	  some	  aspects	  of	  life	  deny,	  or	  at	  least	  disrupt,	  the	  serious,	  medical	  diagnostic	  narrative.	  	  
That	  Dragon,	  Cancer	  as	  well	  as	  the	  texts	  explored	  in	  this	  chapter	  shed	  light	  upon	  how	  and	  why	  diagnosis	  cannot	  give	  a	  patient,	  or	  his	  or	  her	  family,	  a	  concrete	  image	  of	  how	  disease	  will	  permeate	  their	  lives.	  Diagnosis	  can’t	  bind	  singular	  experiences,	  emotions,	  and	  perspectives	  into	  a	  medical	  phrase,	  but	  expression	  of	  experience	  into	  a	  written	  or	  digital	  narrative	  can	  encapsulate	  some	  of	  these	  unexpected	  aspects	  of	  diseases	  such	  as	  pediatric	  cancer.	  Through	  scenes	  such	  as	  the	  Baby’s	  attempts	  to	  play	  with	  a	  “deflated	  rubber	  ball”	  as	  a	  toy	  (actually	  a	  pediatric	  patient’s	  liver	  drawing	  fluid)	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  home	  as	  an	  island	  at	  sea,	  the	  narratives	  of	  “Canonical	  Babbling	  in	  Peed	  Onk”	  and	  
That	  Dragon,	  Cancer	  provide	  a	  way	  for	  the	  Mother	  and	  the	  Greens	  to	  discover	  how	  to	  carry	  the	  weight	  of	  pediatric	  cancer	  diagnosis	  through	  the	  continuation	  of	  everyday	  family	  life.	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